IN THIS ISSUE:
Mr. Marshal, the day before our conversation, I asked Chata GPT what Silesia brings to mind. I quote his answer: “with its industrial history, coal mines, shafts, slag heaps, and red brick tenement houses.” I suspect that if we asked most of our friends from outside the city, we’d get quite similar answers. In short – the mining world. It’s the past, the present, and perhaps in some respects… the future?
It depends on how we look at it. If we look at it from the perspective of someone who grew up in Silesia and has lived here for decades (and there are quite a few such people), they often associate it with precisely that. Plus, sometimes, with soot on windowsills… Younger generations, however, already know a completely different Silesia – one with mining symbolism, but also developing, green, and modern. As for people from outside the region, even if they have a deeply rooted image of Silesia as a mining region, their perception completely changes when they actually come here and see that practically everything has changed in recent decades… Therefore, to answer your question, it seems to me that associations with mining are a blend of the past and the present.
However, perhaps anticipating further questions, I absolutely don’t think we should shy away from it. Mining and the associations related to it are also a part of our Silesian DNA and something that ties us to the past. These associations, by the way, are very broad. These include a work ethic, a commitment to tradition, and the ability to adapt to changing conditions. This is the foundation on which we can build the future – including the future and continued functioning of the mining sector in the coming years. And this sector – something we often forget – is not just a matter of exploitation, but also a whole range of issues related to our energy security. Without coal, there is no coal-fired power generation, which will remain the foundation of our energy system for many years to come. Mining is also about the people who work in it, who often possess unique competencies and skills. It is also about the development of other activities dependent on it. It is about universities and research institutes and the development of modern technologies within their walls. It is a whole complex of issues related to the reclamation and transformation of post-mining areas, which can be successfully used for new purposes. After all, these are local communities whose lives have centered around mining for many decades. Therefore, mining – present in one form or another – will not disappear from the map of Silesia, at least not anytime soon.
In the near future, however, the policy of limiting mining will continue, so I wanted to ask about the economic aspect. For decades, a thriving mining sector has fostered the image of Silesia as a black Eldorado. People from all over Poland flocked here for work, wages, and a better life. The stream of funds—in the form of taxes and other public contributions—that mining companies contributed to the budgets of the voivodeship and local cities determined the face of this region. To what extent (if at all) is Silesia economically dependent on revenues generated by the mining sector today, in an advanced stage of transformation?
Mining remains a vital component of the local economy. Largely due to revenues from the sector, in 2023 the Silesian Voivodeship ranked second in the ranking of individual voivodeships’ contribution to Poland’s GDP. Suffice it to say that between 2022 and 2025, public payments from Polska Grupa Górnicza alone totaled PLN 18 billion! However, it’s important to remember that the improved mining figures in recent years were primarily due to rising coal prices and the situation on international markets. Mining itself, and consequently the influence of the mining sector (including leading coal companies such as PGG, Węglokoks Kraj, and Południowy Koncern Węglowy) and related companies, will undoubtedly decline in the coming years. And here lies the most important challenge we face. The mining industry and its surroundings are home to numerous entities employing hundreds of thousands of people. The closure of mining companies and the mining-related sector will translate into a decline in corporate income tax (CIT), personal income tax (PIT), and other tax revenues, which could indirectly weaken the entire local economic ecosystem. This means reduced funds in municipal and city budgets and the risk of a significant revenue gap. How will we bridge this gap and how will local governments meet their growing financial needs? This is the question we must face. We need changes in the revenue system of local government units, but also the implementation of new compensation mechanisms similar to the still-functioning Just Transition Fund. Without national funding (such as from the ETS), it will be difficult to maintain the region’s profitability and competitiveness in the face of inevitable decarbonization.
In December, President Karol Nawrocki signed the so-called Mining Act, which guarantees a certain level of social security to workers in closed mines. What about mining companies? Will the adopted solutions be enough to save JSW? And do we have any ideas on the table that could actually lead to effective restructuring in the sector? One of my interlocutors stated that transformational projects usually boil down to finding less disruptive ways to close down the mining industry – that’s all there is to it…
Regarding JSW, in my opinion, neither the inclusion of the group in the act (which we, as the local government, requested) nor the agreement recently reached by the JSW management board will, in and of itself, save the company’s situation. A thorough restructuring is needed, as a result of which, in the long term, costs will not exceed the company’s revenues. The same, incidentally, applies to PGG and Południowy Koncern Węglowy. The situation is certainly not improved by the fact that demand for coal from the commercial power industry is falling much faster than expected. PGG is now extracting and selling as much coal as it was expected to extract and sell in the mid-2030s. Maintaining profitability with current employment levels may prove impossible. This demonstrates that we must—as I have repeatedly urged—reliably, i.e., without politics or self-deception, calculate how much coal we will need and when (similarly, how much energy we will need from solar, wind, gas, or—in the future—nuclear power) and only then plan extraction and employment based on such forecasts.
The transformation itself, although it entails limiting fossil fuel extraction, does not mean the elimination of industrial potential. On the contrary, its goal is to modernize and diversify industry and create new markets. A thorough economic reconstruction of the region is needed. While there has been much talk over the years about protective packages, which are undoubtedly necessary, the problem is much broader. Everything must be done to ensure that mining plants are not closed without first developing economic alternatives, including new jobs. The decarbonization process must be coordinated with investment projects and appropriately timed. Former mine sites and other areas belonging to mining companies can be developed for industrial and energy activities, including the involvement of former sector employees in this process. However, repurposing infrastructure and transferring skills requires support mechanisms and stable financing tools in mining regions.
Does the announced end of support from the Fund for the Future of Funds (FST) significantly change the prospects and forecasts for the coal sector’s transformation? Who will finance this process after 2027?
As the Silesian Voivodeship, we are preparing for various scenarios. In the event that JTF support is not continued (this is not yet a foregone conclusion), we are calling for the creation of alternative instruments to support a just transition. This would involve a mechanism that would provide funds for this purpose in the European budget and define specific areas of support. Ideally, these funds would be managed at the regional level, not the central level.
We also propose establishing a separate specific objective to support transformation processes in mitigating the social, economic, and environmental impacts of achieving EU energy and climate goals.
Work is underway to establish energy strategic intervention areas within the Polish Development Strategy until 2035, which include seven of our mining subregions supported by the JTF. This could impact the subsequent allocation of funds.
We must also create a catalog of legal and organizational tools to effectively manage the transition and attempt—to the extent possible—to reduce its dependence on the constant inflow of external funds. I do not hide the fact that we are counting on close cooperation with the ministries, especially the Ministry of Energy.
We easily forget that the transformation of the Polish mining sector did not begin in the previous or current budget perspective…
The transformation of the mining industry has been underway practically since the political transformation. Even if it has been called by various names over the past forty years. Sure, recent years and those ahead have seen a significant acceleration of related processes, and EU funds are significantly helping us mitigate its inevitable negative consequences (especially in the short and medium term), but we cannot treat them as a given or as some kind of “to be or not to be” transformation.
I also wanted to ask about entities dependent on mining, especially the entire mining-related sector. Are the provincial authorities monitoring the situation of this group? I’ve repeatedly encountered accusations that this group of transformation stakeholders is completely off the radar of the institutions implementing it.
Nothing like that. We see enormous potential in the mining-related industry. We know the numbers from various sources – including reports from the GIPH and the University of Economics – and we are aware of the scale of the problem. As part of the first edition of the Regional Transformation Process Observatory project in 2023, we studied the attitudes, needs, skills, and competence barriers of mine workers and the mining-related sector. We collaborate on an ongoing basis with organizations representing this community, including the GIPH, the Regional Chamber of Commerce, and trade unions. The topic of the dependent mining sector frequently appears on the forum of the Regional Council for a Just Transition.
Are you able to indicate specific activities, projects or financial support for the mining sector?
A significant portion of the Fund’s funding goes to the mining-related sector. The 10.03 and 10.04 measures total PLN 2.2 billion. We finance diversification and modernization projects – from renewable energy and electromobility, through automation and cybersecurity, and more recently, also in the “arms” and defense sectors. Our support has already been used by entities such as FASING, Grenevia, COIG, Carboautomatyka, the Center for Underground Mining Research and Supervision, and many others.
I also wanted to ask about a certain paradox. On the one hand, mining in Silesia is currently much discussed in the context of identity processes and the historical heritage that should be preserved. On the other, voices of discouragement, sometimes even open hostility, are increasingly being voiced. Miners’ pensions, trade union claims, and environmental damage are being censored. Can the region’s identity continue to be successfully built around Silesia’s industrial heritage?
The element of identity is important because mining and its associated symbols and values are ingrained in our Silesian DNA. This heritage encompasses not only museums established in post-mining and post-industrial facilities (including the Industrial Monuments Trail) or mining memorial halls, but also living traditions such as St. Barbara’s Day. We have active mining orchestras, and literature and art devoted to this subject are flourishing. Even if the miner’s profession itself is no longer passed down from generation to generation, values such as work ethic, solidarity, concern for crew safety, and so on, continue to be transferred. This is the foundation on which we can confidently, without shame or even pride, build a new identity and future for Silesia. I would therefore separate the unfavorable voices related to the current economic situation in the sector from identity issues.
However, I believe we undoubtedly have a problem with how we communicate about Silesia. If the majority of messages are demands for subsidies and other financial claims, accompanied by various catastrophic visions (if you don’t give us money, we’ll go bankrupt…), I’m not particularly surprised that we then associate them with problems… Consider Tauron, a major player in the coal energy market, whose communication takes a completely different direction. In my opinion, the mining sector should more strongly emphasize the undoubted benefits it generates (or can generate) based on concrete data, instead of focusing solely on exposing threats and financial difficulties.
From an insider’s perspective, the new image of Silesia, gradually being created over recent decades—one that can no longer be reduced to a coal monoculture—is hard to miss. But is it also visible in the capital and other parts of the country?
I must begin with a digression here. I recently gave a presentation in North Rhine-Westphalia, where I spoke about our Silesian transformation. I also showed photos of Silesia today and in the 1990s. For a long time, North Rhine-Westphalia was a role model for us when it came to the effects of transformation in coal-mining regions. And what did it turn out to be? Most of those present were surprised by what we had achieved, the scale of the projects we implemented, and the evolution of the landscapes. It seemed as if the roles had been reversed. As I walked through the streets of Essen, viewing the post-mining districts, I felt for a moment as if I had been transported back in time to my childhood hometown of Knurów. Today, it’s easier to encounter classic tenement houses in their unchanged form in Essen than in Knurów. This shows how far we have come… And now, returning to your question – this is precisely our task. We are constantly learning how to tell the story of Silesia, to show it for what it is today and what it is becoming. We succeeded in Germany, so why wouldn’t we succeed in Poland?
What would have to be included in such a “story” to break the stereotype?
There are many such elements, but it’s worth laying out a few facts.
Considering average disposable income per capita, we rank second in the country. While wages in mining and industry inflate these figures, salaries in the growing, innovative sectors are increasingly similar or even higher. We have a stable, low unemployment rate of 4.7% (compared to the national average of 6%), although it is naturally higher on the outskirts of the metropolitan area than in Katowice.
From 2014 to 2022, the Silesian Voivodeship (along with Pomerania and Lower Silesia) grew the fastest in Poland, yet it started from a much higher base than poorer regions.
We have the largest pool of ready-made investment land in Poland and the second largest in Central and Eastern Europe – from fully developed greenfield sites to numerous brownfield sites awaiting revitalization. This will create jobs, education, and entertainment opportunities.
Add to this the dynamically developing sectors of business-related services, information and communication technologies, and energy, plus an educated workforce, and we have a picture of a region ready for investment and economic growth.
The environment and air quality are constantly improving.
In 2025, Business Insider ranked Katowice as the best city to live in Poland, leaving Poznań, Wrocław, and Gdańsk behind.
We just need to be able to demonstrate all this.
For years, I’ve been observing with satisfaction the growing interest in Silesia and Silesian culture in Poland. Szczepan Twardoch’s novels, Zbigniew Rokita’s reportages, and now also the controversial series “Lead Children,” directed by Maciej Pieprzyca, which was watched by tens of thousands of viewers two weeks after its premiere. On the other hand, if we look at the economy, the picture seems ambiguous. As you mentioned, we’re seeing the dynamic development of new sectors, low unemployment, a high housing supply, and so on. But we also have a negative external migration balance, an outflow of young people to Małopolska and other voivodeships, and deepening inequalities between the center and the periphery. How can we reverse these trends?
These are the problems we are grappling with and will continue to grapple with in the coming years. To the unfavorable demographic trends, I would also add the low birth rate and rapid aging of the voivodeship’s population, which poses challenges for care institutions and adapting infrastructure to the needs and capabilities of the elderly. But back to the topic at hand: all the issues that determine the quality of life and the attractiveness of Silesia as a place to live require addressing. I’m referring here to the broad (and also qualitative) portfolio of employment opportunities in the region, the availability of housing (including in economic terms), and improving the aesthetics of urban spaces. I believe that the driving force behind most of these elements is economic development and growth. Just look at the example of Wrocław, which has gained a reputation as a good place to live following the influx of capital, investments (including international ones), and the development of new, innovative economic sectors. What we discussed earlier is also significant: the issue of image and the gradual building of a new image for Silesia.
Before coal fell out of favor, the entire, coal-producing Silesia region was seen as a strategic region for Poland. While I have no doubt that transformation can help us emerge from the coal age without major social and economic upheaval, I wonder if we have a chance of maintaining the region’s importance and how to do it…
Relying once again on a single economic sector is unlikely to be an option. A strong and strategic Silesia for Poland and Europe can only become a reality if we properly diversify the local economy. We must develop a broad spectrum of projects, including innovative industry, logistics, IT, and modern technologies.
Renewable energy, electromobility, defense – these are just a few of the first buzzwords I hear in discussions about the new economic face of Silesia…
These sectors are already well-established in Silesia and have the potential to expand. In the mining-related sector, investing in renewable and low-emission energy is very popular. We’re talking not only about projects related to solar energy (e.g., large-scale photovoltaic farms), but also energy storage and heat recovery from mine water.
In terms of defense, the voivodeship boasts companies producing traditional military equipment (e.g., the Rosomak plant belonging to the Polish Armaments Group or the Bumar-Łabędy Mechanical Plant in Gliwice, which manufactures and services armored equipment), as well as specialized vehicles and unmanned aerial systems. Unlike many other regions of the country, we also have the necessary infrastructure in the form of metallurgy, component production, and a suitably qualified workforce.
What about other growing and/or thriving sectors?
The healthcare sector, both public and private, is strong, contributing to high access to healthcare and overall quality of life.
The digital sector is constantly growing. We are taking steps to expand the list of centers covered by the National Program for Supporting High-Performance Computing to include the Upper Silesian-Zagłębie Metropolis. In May 2025, the Silesian University of Technology launched a fully-fledged Computing Center in Katowice with such a computer (Centre for Computational Technology and Sciences – CETINO).
Let’s also look at the new industry, robotics and automation, where we have already achieved many successes. One example is the Silesia Smart Systems platform, which supports industry in digital transformation in the areas of robotics, cybersecurity, and additive technologies.
Despite the turbulence, the automotive sector continues to thrive. It’s worth mentioning the production and development hub project in Jaworzno, which involves the construction of an electric car factory with a production capacity of 300,000 vehicles per year, based on a joint venture model with a global partner. This isn’t a “Polish car” project, but rather the construction of a new generation of Polish automotive industry.
Logistics is flourishing alongside it. We don’t always boast about it, but the voivodeship boasts a well-developed system of transport links. We’re talking about good connections between cities and a well-developed transport infrastructure – from road networks to rail networks and air transport. Expanding the airport in Pyrzowice to handle up to 10 million passengers and 100,000 tons of cargo annually is on the agenda. All of this translates into an influx of investors from the logistics industry, who are eager to locate their warehouses here.
We operate on many fronts – ultimately, we want a flexible economy that easily adapts to the changing needs of residents and markets, and is not held hostage to a single sector.
Transformation skeptics sometimes point out that the provincial government has trouble attracting strategic investments. Are these exaggerated claims? Do you have any lures up your sleeve for large investors?
Not so much a lure as a package of specific tools. Thanks to the Polish Investment Zone and the support of the Katowice Special Economic Zone, investors can obtain tax exemptions of up to 50-70% of eligible costs, especially in areas covered by the FST. This is a real cost advantage… We have investment land, including 8,000 hectares of post-mining and post-industrial land waiting to be developed. We offer brownfield sites with infrastructure, connections, and administrative support. I’ve already mentioned logistics, transport, and communication facilities. Furthermore, as we know, investments love investments, and we already have a lot going on in this area. I mentioned many things earlier, but we can elaborate on this in numbers. The production and development hub in Jaworzno alone is an 8 billion PLN project and potentially 7,000 jobs!
The adoption of a separate special act dedicated to creating incentives for locating investments in the region using post-industrial land could open up new opportunities. A comprehensive mechanism offering preferences for investors while mitigating the risks of operating in difficult terrain.
We will also actively advocate for the region’s potential in the context of developing artificial intelligence and the services it applies to. This includes, among other things, including the region’s inclusion in the Polish AI Ecosystem.
Let’s not forget, after all, that Silesia has 4.3 million inhabitants, a skilled workforce available locally, a vast market, and a well-developed technical infrastructure. These are also factors that attract investors.
Will the Katowice Gaming and Technology Hub become a symbol of Silesia’s transformation?
It undoubtedly has such potential. On the one hand, it embodies modernity and development, the direction we are heading in, and on the other, it is being built on the site of the former KWK “Wieczorek” mine (with much of its infrastructure preserved). It forms a bridge between mining heritage and an economy based on knowledge and modern technology.
But the Hub is not just a symbol; it also has a distinct economic and social dimension. Due to its profile, it can attract investors, startups, and research and development projects, thus strengthening Silesia’s competitiveness. This is where young, talented people will be able to pursue their ambitions and develop their careers without having to leave the region.
Sounds like a dream of a Silesian Silicon Valley…
“Think big,” as they say overseas. I believe this is not a dream, but a real project.
Thank you for the interview
Interviewed by Marcin Hylewski
National Energy and Climate Plan – What awaits Poles?
In December 2025, the Ministry of Energy published the draft National Energy and Climate Plan for 2030, with an outlook to 2040. The document specifies goals for Poland to achieve climate neutrality by 2050, but also outlines specific actions aimed at changing the Polish energy mix. So what consequences will the implementation of the Plan bring for Poles? What does the gradual phase-out of coal mean for us, and how will it impact our budgets?
The project envisions an ambitious energy transition, which involves a dramatic increase in the share of renewable energy sources (RES) in the national energy mix. The main goals adopted in the Plan include a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and an increase in the share of renewable energy sources to over 50% of Poland’s energy mix, and in the long term, to 65-68% by 2040. Wind energy and photovoltaics will play a key role. To achieve these goals, two paths are possible: the accelerated WAM transformation scenario, which assumes additional measures to implement some of the Fit for 55 package commitments, and the sustainable WEM transformation scenario, which is based on currently existing legal and financial instruments.
According to forecasts, demand for hard coal will decline by 2030 to 28.4 million tons (under the sustainable transformation scenario) or to 19.4 million tons (under the accelerated transformation scenario). By 2040, the NECP forecasts predict a further decline in coal consumption to 10.1 million tons (under the sustainable transformation scenario) or just 0.7 million tons (under the accelerated transformation scenario). Domestic coal mining is expected to be the basis for meeting demand.
In this context, the NECP highlights the need for a broad transformation of coal-producing regions, such as Silesia, where the transition away from coal will have the greatest impact on residents’ lives and the labor market. The plan provides support for coal regions and job protection in line with the adopted social contract. Support measures include training and retraining programs, local development programs, partnerships, and collaborations. However, the financing of these measures is not entirely clear, as the Plan states: “The measure will be implemented using available funds.”
What does this mean for Poles?
On the one hand, the growing share of renewable energy sources is expected to reduce energy costs in the long term, but in the short term, price increases are expected due to grid transformation, investments in energy generation, and additional fees resulting from the ETS-2 CO2 emissions trading system, which is scheduled to enter into force in 2027 (or – if fuel and energy prices are too high in the current 2026 – in 2028).
By 2028, fossil fuels, including coal and gas, will bear additional emissions costs, which will be passed on to energy and fossil fuel prices. The introduction of ETS-2, which will also cover the construction and transport sectors, could further increase the cost of living. Higher fuel costs will impact household budgets. In particular, those living in municipalities outside major cities that rely on individual transport may experience significant fuel price increases. To minimize the impact, the Plan emphasizes the development of public transport and investments in alternative forms of mobility.
The most noticeable change for residents, however, will be the transition to alternative heating sources, including electricity and renewable energy. By 2030, the era of coal in individual heating is expected to end in cities, and by 2040 in rural areas as well. In poorly insulated buildings, switching to electric heating can be challenging, and without thermal modernization, there is a real risk of rising heating costs. For many households, this will require replacing furnaces and modernizing buildings. Therefore, the NECP provides support mechanisms for vulnerable individuals, including through investments in energy efficiency and temporary shelters that will help alleviate the effects of fuel poverty. Although the document declares protection for vulnerable households, it does not provide detailed information on the bill protection mechanism or a clear definition of who receives assistance and when. Therefore, everything will depend on subsequent legislation and the scale of available EU funds.
The plan places significant emphasis on the development of the prosumer market, thanks to photovoltaics and other renewable energy sources. However, access to new technologies such as photovoltaics and heat pumps poses the greatest challenge. In rural regions, especially in poorly connected areas where access to heating and gas networks is lacking, the costs of the transition may be unbearable for many families.
The National Energy and Climate Plan is a transformation that requires significant investments in networks and generation.
A common perception is that the Polish hard coal mining industry is a kind of “black hole,” sucking billions of złoty from the state budget (i.e., taxpayers’ pockets). This money disappears without a trace and to no benefit to anyone except, of course, mining companies and mine workers. The reality, however, is much more complex. Each year, leading mining companies pay the state, and above all, the economy, amounts significantly exceeding what they receive under the support system.
The vast majority of money from PGG goes to Polish companies
This isn’t going to be a piece about how hard coal mining in Poland is a great business, and the public just hasn’t noticed yet. The bare data, such as mining costs compared to revenues from the sale of this raw material, and the dramatic signals coming from mining companies in recent months clearly demonstrate the current state of the industry. Instead, it will be about the fact that, when considered in the context of the entire economy, the picture is more complex, and that financial flows in the sector have many recipients.
“Every year, we donate approximately PLN 10 billion to the state and mining-related companies,” announced Łukasz Deja, president of the Polish Mining Group, at a conference organized as part of the 4th National St. Barbara’s Day Miners’ Meeting at the Silesian University of Technology in Gliwice.
Specifically, in terms of civil law payments, as CEO Deja was referring to them at the time, the company he heads paid PLN 9.7 billion in 2024, of which nearly two-thirds stayed in the Silesian Voivodeship, and almost all of it (99%) flowed to companies based in Poland (in the context of the year-long discussion on economic patriotism and so-called local content, it is noticeable that many other industries cannot demonstrate a similar degree of Polonization of their base).
Last year saw a rather significant decline, but PGG still pumped PLN 7.8 billion into various business entities through civil law payments. In total, between 2022 and 2025, the total amount paid by Poland’s largest mining company in this regard reached PLN 36 billion. The recipients of this money were approximately 3,500 suppliers employing approximately 100,000 people. people (99.6% domestic), 68% of whom operate in the Silesian Voivodeship. It is in the context of these numbers that the often-used argument that one job in mining translates into four in industries cooperating with it should be understood.
The mining concern shared the profit by becoming a sponsor of new roads
However, these are not the only figures presented by PGG, seeking to defend itself against the claim that it is solely a recipient of public funds. Between 2022 and 2025, the company paid PLN 18 billion in public-law payments (PLN 3.7 billion of which in 2025 alone). This money went in the form of taxes to the state budget (in 2024, this was significant because over 38% of the personal income tax collected from a given municipality was subsequently returned to that municipality’s budget; in the case of cities with district rights, the figure was even higher), and in the form of environmental fees to Polish Waters, the National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management, and the Silesian Voivodeship. This pool also included contributions to the State Fund for the Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons and the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS). Of course, at this point, one could argue that paying ZUS contributions should be standard practice, not something to be proud of, although many who worked for years in various industries under non-contributory civil contracts would certainly consider this “little thing” a welcome change in their professional lives.
And finally, the “icing on the cake.” In 2023-2024, PGG contributed approximately PLN 228 million to the Government Road Development Fund (formerly known as the Local Government Road Fund), a mechanism supporting local government units through targeted subsidies from the state budget to finance their own projects related to the construction, reconstruction, or repair of district and municipal roads. And it contributed because, pursuant to the RFRD Act, its funds come from, among other things, the following: from contributions from sole shareholder state-owned companies, amounting to 7.5% of their profits after income tax. The PLN 187 million transferred to the Fund by PGG in 2024 represented 49% of the total contributions from state-owned companies. Considering the total amount of funding for all projects eligible for such support nationwide (nearly PLN 4.6 billion), this may not seem impressive, but compared to the amount allocated to the Silesian Voivodeship alone (PLN 235.6 million in 2004), it is significant. It is also greater than the total value of funding from the program for the Opole, Lubusz, and West Pomeranian Voivodeships.
“Half of the bypasses currently being built with funds from this budget are financed by the Polish Mining Group,” stated President Łukasz Deja, with some satisfaction.
The highest salaries are where the coal is mined. Business service centers and new technologies have not provided such an effect.
The calculations presented by PGG (especially those concerning civil law payments) highlight something seemingly obvious, yet sometimes overlooked in analyses: mining is not only the source of income for mining companies’ employees, but also for a whole host of collaborators (estimates of the number of employees vary widely, with the highest estimates reaching as high as 300,000). Perhaps it’s they who are currently rooting for the longest possible future of the mining sector in Poland, aware that they are “in the same boat” with it, while simultaneously being deprived—unlike mining companies—of any state support instruments.
Yes, the role of mining in the region’s economy is steadily declining, but this decline isn’t occurring at an even pace everywhere. There are municipalities where the mines are a mere memory, perhaps even traces in their city coats of arms (e.g., Zagłębie Dąbrowskie); others where the industry merely supplements other, more promising sectors. But there are also areas where it remains a significant element of the local economic ecosystem. The mines themselves are a key element here, if only because of the relatively large number of well-paid jobs (and the combination of both these factors, i.e., the number and quality of jobs, is still a challenge for many industries). It is no coincidence that for many years, the highest average salaries in the Silesian Voivodeship have been recorded not in the capital city of Katowice with its numerous business services centers, nor in Gliwice with its technology and automotive companies, and growing aviation sector, but in Jastrzębie-Zdrój, a city located on the outskirts of the region, a city in its current form shaped by hard coal mining. Due to the current system of local government financing (they receive a 7% share of residents’ income), this relatively large number of well-paid jobs directly impacts local government revenues and the quality of the public services they offer, to some extent preserving the fading image of the “rich-breadwinner.”
Therefore, if we are to attempt some colorful comparisons in the context of the financial side of hard coal mining, we can rather risk the statement that the industry is not a bottomless pit, but a rather complex system distributing funds under its control to smaller recipients. This, of course, does not exempt us from difficult questions about the source of funds in this entire system.
Michał Wroński
journalist at the economic website WNP.PL
Global coal production in 2025 reached approximately 8.85 billion tons, a new record. The International Energy Agency (IEA) expects coal demand to flatten in the coming years.
The IEA reports that global coal demand in 2025 reached a record high of 8.85 billion tons, representing a 0.5% increase compared to 2024.
The agency has not yet released full data on coal production by country in 2025.
For years, China has been the largest coal producer, with approximately 4.78 billion tons mined in 2024. The IEA indicates that coal consumption in China in 2025 was similar to that in 2024, at approximately 4.95 billion tons.
Changes in the energy sector will affect the coal market
India ranks second in terms of coal production, with nearly 1.05 billion tons produced in 2024. The IEA reports that in 2025, India’s early and intense monsoon season caused annual coal consumption to decline for the third time in five decades.
Indonesia has become a significant player in the coal market, producing nearly 836 million tons of coal in 2024. It is currently one of the world’s largest exporters of thermal coal. These exports are driven by strong demand in Asia, primarily China, India, Japan, and South Korea. This is in addition to the strong domestic demand for coal.
In the United States, higher natural gas prices and political decisions that slowed the closure of coal-fired power plants increased coal consumption in 2025, which had been on a declining trend for the past 15 years. In 2024, the US produced approximately 465 million tons of coal.
The agency reports that, after two years of double-digit declines, coal demand in the European Union declined only slightly in 2025.
The IEA expects global coal demand to decline slightly by 2030, returning to its 2023 level. This is largely due to changes in the energy sector, which currently accounts for two-thirds of coal consumption. With increasing renewable energy capacity, the expansion of nuclear power, and the strong growth of the liquefied natural gas market, coal-fired electricity production is projected to decline from 2026. Industrial coal demand is expected to remain stable.
In China, which currently accounts for more than half of global coal consumption, demand is expected to decline slightly by the end of the decade. The country continues to rapidly expand renewable energy capacity, and the government aims to reach peak domestic coal consumption by 2030.
Uncertainty and flattening
“Despite unusual trends in several key coal markets in 2025, our forecast for the coming years remains unchanged, and we continue to expect global coal demand to plateau and then decline by 2030,” said Keisuke Sadamori, Director of Energy Markets and Security at the International Energy Agency (IEA).
He acknowledges that there are many uncertainties affecting the outlook for coal, particularly in China, where developments—from economic growth and policy decisions to energy market conditions and weather—will continue to have a profound impact on the global situation.
The IEA expects the largest absolute increase in coal consumption through 2030 to occur in India, where demand is expected to grow by an average of 3% annually, leading to an overall increase of over 200 million tons. Meanwhile, the fastest growth is forecast in Southeast Asia, where demand is expected to grow by over 4%. annually by 2030.
If China experiences faster-than-expected growth in electricity consumption, slower integration of renewable energy sources, or large investments in coal gasification, this could cause global coal demand to rise above forecasts, according to the report. There is also significant uncertainty around the pace of electricity demand growth globally, both in developed and developing economies, as well as uncertainty about policies and the pace of coal substitution in some sectors and regions.
In recent years, Chinese coal demand has bolstered global trade, mitigating the impact of falling imports from the European Union, Japan, Korea, and other countries. However, China reduced imports in 2025 due to oversupply and weak demand, a trend expected to continue through 2030. This is expected to lead to a decline in global coal trade.
According to the IEA, the outlook for coking coal appears to be improving due to India’s reliance on imports to support its growing steel industry.
Dariusz Ciepiela
The author is a journalist at WNP.PL.
