The National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) is intended to be a strategic document developed by European Union member states, outlining the assumptions, policies, and actions taken to meet the EU’s climate and energy goals. This particularly addresses issues related to achieving climate neutrality by 2050.
Until recently, a process known as consultations on the new NECP, a more ambitious version than the one formally submitted to the European Commission (EC) in 2019 (with a subsequent amendment in February 2024), was underway. The direction of the transformation of the national energy and heating sector, including, for obvious reasons, the mining sector, is beyond dispute. However, it must reconcile the requirements of the EU plan and climate goals with the state and needs of the Polish economy and the public interest. The goals declared in the NECP should take into account the overall impact on the economy and citizens’ quality of life. They must also take into account the adjustments to the original pre-pandemic assumptions and the subsequent collapse of the fuel and energy markets. Finally, they cannot ignore the events and threats following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In times of chaos and political turmoil, domestic coal resources, which can easily be converted into heat and electricity, are proving to be valuable. Not only in Poland but also in our international environment. Therefore, it seems essential to preserve an appropriate portion of energy sovereignty, including domestic raw material and production resources, in the event of external threats.
The originators and proponents of the NECP fail to recognize these facts, as well as the resulting need to revise the proposed long-term EU energy strategy and policy. Without this revision, reviewing the plan becomes unfounded, and continuing the process in its current form makes little sense. It will not meet the requirement of the state’s constitutional responsibility for Poland’s energy security.
The European Commission’s priorities in the areas of economy and industry for the current term are crucial for the NECP, but are not fully known or articulated. This includes the details of the announced new plan for decarbonizing the European economy (Clean Industry Deal). The question remains unanswered: how the EU will respond to the conclusions of Mario Draghi’s recent report, which, while calling for the completion of the green transformation, requires maintaining its competitiveness. It also highlights the dangers associated with the inevitable, to some extent, dependence of green technology supplies on high-risk suppliers. All of this clearly indicates the need to revise the current strategy.
In recent days, proceedings have been initiated against Poland and twelve other countries that have not yet updated their climate plans. The European Commission is showing impatience, as these documents are expected to be crucial in drawing up climate action plans, which are intended to enable the achievement of the EU’s tightened climate and energy targets by 2030. The 2030 targets are more stringent and costly than those adopted earlier for that year as part of the 2050 strategy. For many EU economies, their implementation may prove much more difficult than planned. This is also the case for Poland, and perhaps even more so.
The question also arises about the order in which EU climate plans are established, with the consequent legislative enforcement of their implementation. The European Commission is urging the update of the NECP, suggesting that from its inception it should serve as a document serving as a basis for revising national energy development scenarios in line with the EU’s climate ambitions, which is bound to raise objections.
The previous version of the NECP from 2019 has become significantly outdated. This was influenced by both external events and changes in our circumstances. It did not take into account the dynamic development of renewable energy sources in Poland, the new reduction targets set by the EU, or the impact of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on changes in fuel supply directions and the impact on the European energy market. Problems with our national energy system and the investment needs for a sustainable energy transformation in Poland were also excluded from its scope. It omitted investments in energy infrastructure, not just grid infrastructure, and the issue of increased cybersecurity, without which it will be difficult to manage and bill in real time thousands of new energy producers operating in a highly dispersed environment. Ultimately, it ignored the problem of threats to maintaining the continuity of energy supplies due to power shortages. The draft under consultation, in its currently pushed version, is much more “ambitious.” Therefore, it is also difficult to accept. This is especially true given the fact that the position of the largest greenhouse gas emitters at the November COP-29 conference in Baku has clearly hardened. They highlighted a number of challenges they will have to face in the coming years. The issue of geopolitical instability and security came to the forefront.
The National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) is intended to be a strategic document developed by European Union member states, outlining the assumptions, policies, and actions taken to meet the EU’s climate and energy goals. This particularly addresses issues related to achieving climate neutrality by 2050.
Until recently, a process known as consultations on the new NECP, a more ambitious version than the one formally submitted to the European Commission (EC) in 2019 (with a subsequent amendment in February 2024), was underway. The direction of the transformation of the national energy and heating sector, including, for obvious reasons, the mining sector, is beyond dispute. However, it must reconcile the requirements of the EU plan and climate goals with the state and needs of the Polish economy and the public interest. The goals declared in the NECP should take into account the overall impact on the economy and citizens’ quality of life. They must also take into account the adjustments to the original pre-pandemic assumptions and the subsequent collapse of the fuel and energy markets. Finally, they cannot ignore the events and threats following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In times of chaos and political turmoil, domestic coal resources, which can easily be converted into heat and electricity, are proving to be valuable. Not only in Poland but also in our international environment. Therefore, it seems essential to preserve an appropriate portion of energy sovereignty, including domestic raw material and production resources, in the event of external threats.
The originators and proponents of the NECP fail to recognize these facts, as well as the resulting need to revise the proposed long-term EU energy strategy and policy. Without this revision, reviewing the plan becomes unfounded, and continuing the process in its current form makes little sense. It will not meet the requirement of the state’s constitutional responsibility for Poland’s energy security.
The European Commission’s priorities in the areas of economy and industry for the current term are crucial for the NECP, but are not fully known or articulated. This includes the details of the announced new plan for decarbonizing the European economy (Clean Industry Deal). The question remains unanswered: how the EU will respond to the conclusions of Mario Draghi’s recent report, which, while calling for the completion of the green transformation, requires maintaining its competitiveness. It also highlights the dangers associated with the inevitable, to some extent, dependence of green technology supplies on high-risk suppliers. All of this clearly indicates the need to revise the current strategy.
In recent days, proceedings have been initiated against Poland and twelve other countries that have not yet updated their climate plans. The European Commission is showing impatience, as these documents are expected to be crucial in drawing up climate action plans, which are intended to enable the achievement of the EU’s tightened climate and energy targets by 2030. The 2030 targets are more stringent and costly than those adopted earlier for that year as part of the 2050 strategy. For many EU economies, their implementation may prove much more difficult than planned. This is also the case for Poland, and perhaps even more so.
This also raises questions about the order in which EU climate plans are established, with the consequent legislative enforcement of their implementation. The European Commission is urging the NECP to be updated, suggesting that from the outset it should serve as a document serving as a basis for adjusting national energy development scenarios to align with the EU’s climate ambitions, which is bound to raise objections.
The previous version of the NECP, from 2019, has become significantly outdated. This was influenced by both external events and changes in our circumstances. It failed to take into account the dynamic development of renewable energy sources in Poland, the new reduction targets set by the EU, or the impact of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on changes in fuel supply directions and the impact on the European energy market. Problems with our national energy system and the investment needs for a sustainable energy transformation in Poland were also excluded from its scope. It omitted investments in energy infrastructure, not just grid infrastructure, and the issue of increased cybersecurity, without which it will be difficult to manage and bill thousands of new energy producers operating in highly dispersed environments in real time. Finally, it ignored the threat to maintaining the continuity of energy supply due to power shortages. The draft under consultation, in its currently pushed version, is much more ambitious. Therefore, it is also difficult to accept. This is especially true given the stance of the largest greenhouse gas emitters at the COP-29 conference in Baku in November. They highlighted a number of challenges they will have to face in the coming years. Geopolitical instability and national security were at the forefront (particularly in the context of, among other things, the possible expansion of various “trouble spots”). This applies to a large extent to European Union countries as well, and especially to Poland due to the threat of aggression from beyond our eastern border and the need to defend national sovereignty.
Considering the above, it is impossible to comment on the draft NECP until the revision and adoption of Poland’s Energy Policy until 2040. Its foundation should be a vision that takes into account the obligation to ensure the country’s energy security in the long term.
Domestic electricity production relies predominantly on hard coal and lignite. The development of emission-free, renewable energy sources, dependent on weather conditions, may prove insufficient in the context of growing final consumption. The latter is secured primarily by coal-fired power units, which also constitute the cheapest reserve of the National Power System (NPS) during the transition. This will continue until at least the 2040s. They also serve as a kind of insurance policy during the development of renewable energy sources and infrastructure. It is necessary to create a “balance-sheet and strategic reserve” for short-term regulation and for external threats, and this cannot be achieved without ensuring coal supplies, preferably from domestic resources. A strategy for the Polish mining industry should call for this, establish it, and structure it, along with a restructuring program (while maintaining extraction capacity for the energy sector and the rest of the domestic market), phased over the coming years in proportion to the changing needs resulting from the energy transition and changes in the economy. The threat of external aggression also requires changes to the project for utilizing coal mining potential and the potential for generating energy from it, as defined by the strategic reserve.
These and many other important issues, however, are beyond the scope of the NECP, which fails to take these facts into account. A mining restructuring program that addresses these needs must be urgently developed and adopted. Only then will an opinion on the NECP be meaningful.
The active transformation option adopted in the presented draft – WAM (With Additional Measures) – assumes an earlier phase-out of coal. The proposed dynamics of this process until 2030 are unrealistic due to the state of the national energy system and the needs of the domestic market outside the energy sector. It significantly deviates not only from the facts but also from the social consensus on the decommissioning of coal mining in Poland. Without agreement on the changes in this document, the NECP will lead to significant and costly chaos. Only after these changes are implemented in an agreed-upon form will an opinion on the NECP be justified.
The NECP is also too general and does not include annexes with detailed analyses, including input data, which would allow for an assessment of the quality of the assumptions made and, ultimately, the results of the analyses. There should be more scenarios, assessing sensitivity to changes in key parameters used in calculations, such as fuel prices, CO2, and the cost of money. The financing annex lacks a description of future sources of funds for the transition, such as funds related to the introduction of the ETS2 system for road transport and buildings. For businesses in the mining sector and its surroundings, investment decisions without a clear projection of the system’s requirements will be fraught with risks that will prevent the commitment of financial resources. This applies not only to necessary investments but also to short-term economic projections. Without this, continued mining operations will face the threat of total chaos. The general data cited raises the presumption that they serve more to create a positive narrative for the document than to address the full impact of the proposed provisions. Climate rhetoric appears to be replacing reliable and responsible economic forecasts.
In summary, the NECP fails to incorporate—as it should—the appropriate gradation and chronology of strategic documents. Economic policy should come first, followed by energy policy and a mining program, which must prioritize ensuring a continuous supply of electricity with a low carbon footprint and competitive prices. These policies should be the basis for making concrete commitments to EU institutions. The opposite order undermines the document’s credibility and indicates a radical shift away from the realities of our economy (including those related to mining and energy).
Herbert Leopold Gabryś
The decarbonization of the Polish energy sector is gaining momentum. Declarations from energy company representatives clearly indicate that the mining sector will continue to lose customers for coal produced in mines. In this context, the project of “coal-to-nuclear” decarbonization, i.e., the conversion of selected coal-fired power plants into nuclear power plants, is noteworthy. This transformation would reduce the costs of launching new nuclear power plants while simultaneously enabling the employment of workers currently employed in coal-fired power plants.
Producing energy from coal is a way to reduce losses. Corporations without sentiment
The Rybnik power plant can be considered both a symbol and a portent. It’s a symbol of the policies of energy companies, which, for the sake of their own financial results, are increasingly moving towards a break with coal.
“We have no other choice. From a market perspective, there is no economic justification for its continued operation,” said Paweł Stępień, director of the investment department at Polska Grupa Energetyczna, about the Rybnik coal plant during the October meeting of the Parliamentary Committee for Energy and the Energy and Mining Transformation in Poland.
“Sources that are expensive in terms of production costs due to CO2 emissions or fuel costs are being pushed out of the electricity market.” “We lose 200 PLN on variable costs alone per MWh, not to mention fixed and capital costs,” admitted a PGE representative, explaining the reasons why the PGE Group (or more precisely, PGE Górnictwo i Energetyka Konwencjonalna) wants to phase out coal-fired electricity production in Rybnik by the end of next year, and heat production in August 2026, replacing the coal-fired units with a combined cycle power plant currently under construction, the largest in Poland and one of the largest of its kind in Europe. From the mining industry’s perspective, this will mean eliminating a major customer, consuming 1.5 million tons of coal annually. This is a significant loss, especially considering the context of declining sales and production, as well as the age-old problem with the energy sector’s acceptance of domestic coal.
Rybnik is in the news these days, but signals from the energy industry leave no doubt that more such situations will arise in the near future. This is especially true given the upcoming end of the capacity market auctions next year, which serve as a sort of “readiness premium” for coal-fired power plants. It was thanks to this that the Tauron Group maintained its 200 MW units. However, next year, as many as 10 of Tauron’s 12 200 MW units will be deprived of such support, and the company’s management leaves no doubt as to how they will react to this.
“When the capacity market expires, the economic viability of operating these units will cease. Those units without the capacity market will be decommissioned. This change is not a matter of the future, but of the fourth quarter of this year, the first quarter of next year,” Grzegorz Lot, CEO of the Tauron Group, clearly stated during the Energy Days event in Katowice. He explained that the two remaining 200 MW units will be covered by the capacity market until 2028 and “will continue to operate until then,” because with operation ranging from 1,000 to 2,000 hours per year, “there is no way to cover costs and generate any margin on electricity.”
According to LOT’s CEO, the immediate future would look completely different if the capacity market mechanism were maintained for the next few years, as proposed by energy companies. Instead, there will be annual supplementary auctions, in which 41 units from across the country can compete for support.
“Some will win and receive support for the next year, while others will not. My analysis indicates that units that do not receive this support will be decommissioned,” the Tauron CEO assessed.
What if we could replace the coal-fired unit with a nuclear reactor? Such analyses are underway.
It is in this context that the idea of converting coal-fired power plants nearing the end of their useful lives into nuclear power plants is increasingly gaining ground in public discussion. This is officially referred to as an analysis of the potential for a “coal-to-nuclear” transition in Poland (or, more formally, as “formulating a plan for decarbonizing the national energy sector through modernization using Generation III/III+ and IV nuclear reactors”).
The “DeSire” program provides the scientific framework for such analyses. Its leader is the Silesian University of Technology, but partners include the Ministry of Climate and Environment, Energoprojekt-Katowice, the Institute of Nuclear Chemistry and Technology, and the Sobieski Institute. The work assesses the technical and economic potential, the level of social acceptability, and the preparedness of human resources for such a transition.
The primary argument for conducting such studies at all is… the Polish nuclear energy program. It assumes the construction of 6 to 9 GW of installed nuclear capacity in Poland, while the total capacity of the three reactors, the first to be built in Choczewo in Pomerania, is expected to be 3.7 GW. The conclusion is obvious – more nuclear units will be necessary. The only remaining question is their location. And since a veritable “information fog” has surrounded the construction of a nuclear power plant in Konin in recent months (and has not truly cleared), there is even more room for such a discussion.
“The next location should be inland, as we will be able to overcome many general, unfavorable aspects. I would very much like to dispel the notion that nuclear power can only happen in northern Poland. It can also happen in southern Poland. Moreover, it can also happen some distance from the largest urban areas. These urban areas need not only energy but also jobs,” said Professor Andrzej Wajda during one of the Energy Days sessions. Łukasz Bartela from the Faculty of Environmental and Energy Engineering, Silesian University of Technology.
The “DeSire” program is scheduled to conclude next year. In its first phase, 23 potential locations were analyzed, and in the second phase, eight are already being considered (in discussions with project participants so far, Bełchatów, Opole, Kozienice, Jaworzno, as well as Łagisza, Łaziska, Rybnik, and Połaniec have been mentioned).
The “coal to nuclear” path also means cost optimization and employment opportunities for employees
According to officials from the Ministry of Industry, analyses conducted have shown that a coal-to-nuclear transition would allow for savings of several percent compared to a greenfield investment, which, with overall costs running into tens of billions of zlotys, could translate into hundreds of millions of zlotys. As Wojciech Wrochna, Government Plenipotentiary for Strategic Energy Infrastructure and Secretary of State at the Ministry of Industry, points out:
“This is a very good direction. Technologically, replacing coal-fired power plants with nuclear power plants simplifies the investment process. We don’t need to build massive lines to extract power from these plants, as they are already ready. This reduces system costs and, consequently, overall electricity costs. Another important factor is that, from a system continuity perspective, this allows for relatively efficient management and utilization of coal-fired power until nuclear power becomes available and seamlessly replaces the capacity to supply power to the system. Both types of power plants are capable of operating in a system-wide manner and stabilizing the system, so this is also a good solution from a system-wide perspective.” Finally, this solution is good for the region and the country because we can efficiently replace those currently working in the broadly defined hard coal mining and development sector with jobs in the technologically advanced nuclear energy sector.
Representatives of Bechtel (the latter, together with Westinghouse Electric Company, is to build Poland’s first nuclear power plant in Pomerania) also point to the profitability of such a transformation. Leszek Hołda, CEO of Bechtel Polska, cites in this context the results of American analyses indicating that locations where coal-fired power plants currently operate are very favorable for locating a nuclear power plant.
“Firstly, it is the optimization of the costs of the associated infrastructure – all transmission is ready, access roads, and potentially railways. Approximately 30% of these costs can be optimized through such a location. Secondly, human resources. In fact, all the resources that are in place and operating in a coal-fired power plant can be used in a nuclear power plant.” New, better-paid roles are also emerging, increasing the attractiveness of a given location as a workplace. Thirdly, per capita income and tax revenue are increasing,” Bechtel explained.
“We’ve seen several cases around the world where a coal-fired power plant was closed, and there was a nuclear power plant nearby, and the operator poached the laid-off workers, provided some training, and now they’re working at that nuclear power plant,” admitted Andrzej Sidło, ministerial advisor from the Department of Nuclear Energy at the Ministry of Industry, during the same discussion.
Of course, nothing will necessarily come of all these arguments. They may – like many others before them – remain in the realm of “interesting, but unimplemented” ideas. Even proponents of the “coal-to-nuclear” transformation emphasize that key decisions in this matter should rest with the electricity grid operator. On the other hand, the weight of these arguments and the stature of the entities behind these analyses demand that they be taken seriously.
Michał Wroński, journalist of the regional website SlaZag.pl
Madam President, in two years, it will be three decades since NAT was founded. Since then, its offerings have evolved, and the agency’s profile and scope of operations have also changed. Can you explain to our readers what NAT is and what journey it has taken from its inception in 1996 to the present day?
Nadwiślańska Agencja Turystyczna Sp. z o.o. (Nadwiślańska Agencja Turystyczna Sp. z o.o.) has been operating as a leisure organizer since 1997. Initially closely linked to the mining industry and Upper Silesia, today it is one of the largest national hotel and resort chains operating under the NAT brand.
The company was established in 1996 as an initiative of Nadwiślańska Spółka Węglowa S.A., which, as part of the restructuring of the mining sector, contributed fifteen resorts in kind, creating the foundation for a new tourism company. NAT officially began operations on February 1, 1997, with five facilities. Earlier efforts to establish it were finalized on December 16, 1996, when the company was entered into the register by the District Court in Katowice.
Since its inception, NAT has consistently expanded its operations. It currently manages 17 resorts, including 10 hotels and 7 resorts, as well as the Cieńków Ski Resort in Wisła. Over the past two decades, NAT has built a strong presence in Polish tourism, offering a wide range of recreational and health-promoting stays while remaining true to its mining traditions.
The chain’s offerings include family vacations, health-promoting stays, and active leisure activities in Pomerania, Masuria, the Kłodzko Region, the Beskid Mountains, and Podhale.
What facilities can NAT boast in terms of infrastructure, accommodation, etc.?
The Nadwiślańska Agencja Turystyczna (NAT) is synonymous with exceptional destinations and comfortable relaxation in Poland. Our properties are located in the most beautiful corners of the country: on the Baltic Sea, by pristine lakes, and surrounded by mountain landscapes. Each location guarantees proximity to nature and a space ideal for relaxation.
We have wellness areas, treatment rooms, and offer professional preventative, therapeutic, and spa services tailored to the health needs of our guests. We have sports fields, outdoor and indoor gyms. We don’t forget about our youngest guests, who are welcome to enjoy playgrounds and playrooms. We also organize entertainment programs.
Our cuisine is based on Polish, home-style flavors. Most meals are served as sumptuous buffets with beverages, where each guest can compose their own meal according to their preferences.
There’s something for everyone – our properties offer standards for every budget, while ensuring comfort and meticulous attention to our guests’ expectations.
We are a brand that values honesty, responsibility, hospitality, and safety. What sets us apart is our genuine passion and commitment to tourism. We strive to create places that people enjoy returning to.
Besides our hotels and resorts, NAT’s other attractions include a marina with water sports equipment rentals in Kalbornia, the Cieńków cable car in Wisła (Cieńków Ski Resort in winter), and the unique à la carte restaurant TaTRAdycja in Bukowina Tatrzańska.
You’re targeting individuals, but I know businesses are also eager to use your services. What can NAT offer business customers?
Yes, NAT’s primary clientele is individuals, but we also serve business clients with great success, providing comprehensive organization of conferences, training sessions, and various corporate events. Thanks to our diverse accommodations and extensive infrastructure, we can plan an event that perfectly suits the needs of any company, regardless of scale or format.
NAT facilities offer spacious conference and training rooms, allowing for meetings for groups ranging from 20 to 200 people. We guarantee professional service at every stage of cooperation – from planning to implementation. Our experienced team will take care of every detail, ensuring comfortable conditions and the flexibility to tailor the offer to individual needs.
Hotel* NAT Ustroń and Hotel* NAT Wisła are very popular in Silesia. We often host training and conference groups at these facilities, which value their location and service.
Although few people know this, NAT also has quite significant connections with mining…
Nadwiślańska Agencja Turystyczna Sp. z o.o. was established as a result of restructuring efforts within the mining industry, aimed at separating the non-production zone from the mines. Several companies were established at that time, with Nadwiślańska Spółka Węglowa as the sole shareholder. Today, the company is owned by Holding KW sp. z o.o.
Is this why your facilities host mining events more often, or perhaps companies in this industry are more willing to use NAT services?
Yes, our facilities often host events related to the mining industry, a result of NAT’s long-standing and strong ties with this sector. Our offerings are eagerly chosen not only by mining companies organizing conferences, training sessions, and meetings, but also by individual guests. In cooperation with companies, we organize preventative and therapeutic stays. We ensure that our services meet the needs of this group, ensuring comfort and a unique atmosphere.
We also remember our roots, supporting local mining-related events and engaging in industry initiatives. We often receive sentimental comments from our guests who proudly recall, “I built this facility…” This is a great honor and motivation for us to continue developing our facilities with employees and supporters of the mining sector in mind.
Let’s also talk about your role. Since September 2024, you’ve headed the NAT board. Do you anticipate any significant changes to the agency’s operations? What development goals are on the horizon?
On August 28th, I was temporarily delegated to serve as President of the Management Board of Nadwiślańska Agencja Turystyczna Sp. z o.o. My priority is to raise the standard of our facilities and adapt them to the changing needs of our customers. We are planning a series of renovations and modernizations that will significantly improve the comfort and quality of service in all our locations. My goal is for NAT to be perceived as a brand offering not only excellent leisure facilities but also exceptional experiences for business and individual clients.
We also see the development of our wellness offerings and strengthened cooperation with local communities on the horizon. We want NAT to be a symbol of quality and commitment to tradition, but also modernity, meeting the needs of all our customer groups.
Thank you for the interview, and I wish you success in implementing these plans.
Interview by Marcin Hylewski
