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Two days ago, at the Silesian Museum, your lecture opened the conference “Sovereignty Begins in Silesia: Energy, Security, Industry,” which was devoted to the transformation of Silesia, but also, more broadly, to the transformation of the entire fuel and energy sector in Poland and its impact on so-called energy sovereignty. How do you understand this concept, and why does it seem so important today?
We usually operate within a triangle of three concepts that have gained importance in recent years – particularly in the context of regional armed conflicts. Until now, we have primarily used the classic concept of “energy security,” as defined in energy law. It involves the constant ability to supply the energy system with sufficient energy to ensure its continuous operation.
The second concept is “energy sovereignty.” It came into circulation in the 1960s, when, due to the expansive actions of major global oil companies in South America, several countries (such as Venezuela) were deprived of the ability to function normally in the energy sector. It is worth remembering that the 1960s and 1970s were a time when energy fuels were crucial for the economy and development – both economic and social. The term we are discussing was used successively in reference to food resources and resurfaced in the early 2000s, when the foundations of the European Union’s climate policy were laid. Then, beyond climate goals, “energy sovereignty” began to be thought of as a certain independence or the necessity of having “our own” energy sources. This was the starting point of European climate policy. Its creators realized that we did not have enough fossil fuels to make them – in the long term – a pillar of the EU’s energy sector. Imports of fossil fuels were already surging, meaning we had to source some energy outside the EU. This is how the idea of switching to renewable fuels arose, promising independence from the need to purchase energy resources from external suppliers.
And finally, the third, extremely timely context: the issue of so-called resilience. After the Spanish blackout, the Polish Power Grids issued an “anti-blackout” pact, which addresses how to ensure the system is “resistant” to various types of disruptions, including both external ones (resulting from cyberattacks, for example) and internal ones. But resilience can also be considered more broadly. We discuss the resilience of the system as a whole, as well as the resilience of specific solutions and energy sources. Finally, the concept of distributed energy refers to resilience. In this case, it’s about resilience (also on a micro-scale) to various types of events causing power outages. For example, if we build a system that includes photovoltaics and energy storage, this makes us immune to possible longer interruptions in the grid’s energy supply. Despite differences and nuances, all three concepts are closely related and, in principle, it’s difficult to consider them separately today.
During Monday’s conference, Poland’s energy sovereignty was repeatedly linked to its coal resources and the role they could play in the transition to a new, green economy. Professor Andrzej Rzońca’s remarks were surprising in this context, repeating twice that coal mining in Silesia and Poland, if it still has any value, is only “historical.” Furthermore, it is essentially a burden on the entire economy, unable to function without subsidies, and furthermore, it drives up energy prices to some of the highest levels in the EU. Do you agree with this opinion?
If we lived in an orderly, secure world where everything, or most things, were predictable, then ending mining would be relatively simple. We have a relatively clear plan to replace fossil fuels with renewables, a program to use less carbon-intensive gas for electricity generation, and a vision for the use of energy storage (both systemically and “domestic”). Nevertheless, there are still many unknowns in this puzzle. For example, we can currently only store the energy we produce on a short-term basis, for example, in weekly intervals, which is sufficient to meet our energy needs for most of the year, but this doesn’t solve problems during “cold” months, like this November, when there’s little sunlight. In these conditions, it’s difficult to fill storage, and without it, we won’t be able to move forward with long-term planning. Furthermore, we live in times where cyberattacks are common, warfare is ongoing nearby, and politics is shifting towards nationalist movements, as well as restricting global trade. The environment and conditions are unstable, which means any forecasts we have are subject to a greater risk of planning errors. In other circumstances, I would be inclined to discuss accelerating decarbonization with Professor Rzońca…
Furthermore, I feel that in the discussion about the importance of coal (for Poland and Silesia), we are often faced with a certain misunderstanding. I don’t believe it can be assessed solely based on the contribution of coal companies to the national GDP… That it is a “declining” fuel is obvious. However, its role is that we absolutely need it to ensure, firstly, energy security, and secondly, a minimum of energy sovereignty in the event that we lack access to gas, which in the so-called first energy policy (the document “Poland’s Energy Policy until 2040” adopted by the Council of Ministers in February 2021 – note by M.H.) was identified as a key fuel in the transition period to a zero-emission economy. This document, however, was created under completely different circumstances, in a stable geopolitical situation. Therefore, in my speech on Monday, I argued that if we transition from conventional energy based on fossil fuels to renewable energy, there will be a need for system balancing, which cannot be based solely on gas. We have no guarantee that its supply will always be high enough to meet our demand; supply problems may arise, and it’s possible that gas prices will suddenly skyrocket, as usually happens when the other side knows we’re dependent on something. Therefore, before we close the last coal-fired power plant, we must definitely have another power plant capable of supplying the necessary electricity and regulatory power to the system. Therefore, to ensure the continuity of the national system, rotating coal and gas capacities are essential, which naturally provide so-called “inertia” to the system, as well as chemical energy storage facilities.
So in this scenario we could be at risk of blackouts?
In such a scenario, it could happen one day that we won’t have enough gas or stored energy to keep the system running. During the autumn and winter months, which typically see so-called rotten peaks, when wind and solar sources deliver less than 1 GW of power for a week, we need over 20 GW to keep the system running. I’m not talking about the price of gas, but its availability, with approximately four billion cubic meters of storage capacity and priority for municipal purposes in this regard. In short, if this gas isn’t available or can’t be physically delivered to the power plant (high consumption will cause a pressure drop in the transmission network), the system will shut down. And that’s the role of coal – by balancing the system with coal-fired power plants, we can avoid such a situation. And if this coal is to be imported – like gas – from around the world (e.g., from Asia), I believe it should be produced domestically, even if its production cost is slightly higher.
Staying with costs for a moment… Can we even look at economics and profitability today in isolation from what’s happening on the political map? In times of tension, crises, and geopolitical turbulence – such as the Russia-Ukraine war – markets don’t operate in a laissez-faire manner, and the prices of strategic raw materials are often dictated by the logic of mutual alliances…
Economics is important. I assume that climate policy will not be drastically changed or reversed – it will continue. For me, its primary goal is not, after all, the climate, but European independence, in terms of energy, including in the economic sense. We simply don’t have fuel and have to buy it abroad. So today, as a country, as an economy, on the one hand, we must consider the carbon footprint of electricity, because it translates into product prices and the ability to sell them globally. But on the other hand, we cannot ignore energy prices – they cannot be too high and detached from reality. Furthermore, we must constantly consider the ability to maintain the integrity of the system and its continuous operation, and this comes at a cost. We must maintain certain reserves of fossil fuels, at least during the transition period. This reduces the risk of energy system collapse and increases our security.
Let’s look a bit into the future. Let’s assume a scenario in which the geopolitical situation stabilizes, Russia and Ukraine conclude a truce, and so on. In such a situation, is it worthwhile to strive for the entire national (and European) energy system to be based on renewable sources? Isn’t diversification of energy sources a value in itself? I also ask this in the context of China’s recent announcements of plans to introduce restrictions on the export of rare earth elements. If this scenario materializes, will we be able to develop green energy infrastructure, and will it still be profitable?
When it comes to peace in the east or an end to the conflict, I think few would want it to continue, perhaps except for the military industry lobby and those profiting from this conflict. However, I don’t think normal conditions will return for gas imports from the east – the situation has been relatively permanently reversed there.
On the other hand, today, both fixed and floating gas ports have already been built in European infrastructure (including in Germany, Poland, and the Netherlands). Everything points to us being forced to import LNG and its regasification – somewhat like with liquid fuels, which we also import from other countries.
If we assume that peace returns to NATO’s eastern flank and that the conflict doesn’t threaten to escalate into the Baltic and North Seas, the risk of gas transport and supply problems won’t be overestimated. This, in turn, will accelerate the phase-out of coal and increase the share of gas in the mix.
Moreover, my proposal to balance the system half on gas and half on coal assumes a certain flexibility. That is, if we have relatively cheap and available gas, we can produce more energy from gas (not just during balancing peaks), which translates into a lower carbon footprint. However, if gas prices rise, having coal means we can always use it as a bargaining chip in negotiations with gas suppliers – we gain the option to withdraw if the proposed terms are unsatisfactory (or if they are prohibitive). In this way, we insure ourselves against the consequences of geopolitical changes and market fluctuations, minimizing the risk of the aforementioned blackouts.
The majority of Polish public opinion agrees with the European Union’s climate policy goals and accepts the “green” direction of change. However, doubts remain regarding the timetable and pace of decarbonization. Do you think this is optimal or at least—in some sense—rational?
In my opinion, the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine has significantly changed the rules of the game. Today we know—something we didn’t assume just a few years ago—that we must abandon hydrocarbon imports from the East (give up, not limit…). All calculations and plans for the future must take these new circumstances into account. This, by the way, is not unprecedented. Reality is changing, and so is our knowledge, so plans and strategies must be modified accordingly.
Let’s recall the 1990s, when the main environmental enemy was identified not as CO2, but as sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, dust, and so on. There was parallel discussion of low emissions (domestic furnaces) and high emissions (power plant chimneys), but also linear emissions combined with transport. Then the pendulum began to swing towards CO2, as reflected in the Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force in 2005, and the 2008 EU Climate and Energy Package, which introduced the “3×20” rule (reducing greenhouse gas emissions, increasing the share of energy produced from renewable sources, and improving energy efficiency by 20%). In the meantime, however, the second climate package, the European Green Deal, Fit for 55, and REPowerEU emerged – a series of regulations introduced too closely together for the energy sector and industry to respond effectively.
Therefore, we operate somewhat dichotomously… On the one hand, we would like to close coal-fired power plants, whose emissions contradict the idea of green energy and European climate policy, but on the other hand, we currently cannot do so without exposing ourselves to the severe consequences we have discussed earlier. We are increasing the share of renewable energy in the energy mix, but we must do so in a controlled manner.
In my opinion, the current pace of change may prove too rapid. Investment cycles in the energy sector last from several to a dozen years, making implementing changes overnight or year-to-year essentially unrealistic.
The changes in these documents are reflected in the evolution of the National Energy and Climate Plan. In the recently updated version, climate goals have been further tightened – both for 2030 and 2040, in both presented scenarios…
The amended draft NECP is the version following public consultations in July of this year. The CO2 emission reduction is projected to reach 53.9% in Poland by 2030, compared to 55% in the EU, compared to the reference year. Personally, I consider this a very ambitious goal, which should be examined in terms of the economic impact and costs of its implementation. It’s possible that such an analysis may prove these external commitments difficult to meet. The expenditure of approximately PLN 1,100 billion defined in the NECP is enormous. It may turn out that even if the funds were found, we don’t have enough contractors. The equipment we need will not be produced globally within the assumed timeframe. Today, when ordering gas turbines, the waiting time is around 2-3 years, while the investment cycle for a gas power plant is over 30 months. So, we have a problem…
Should we therefore adopt the NECP in its current version, or can we reject it altogether? The deadline for adopting the document expired last year, prompting the European Commission to appeal against Poland to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)…
The NECP must be adopted because it is our obligation as a member of the EU – we are no different from other countries in this regard. When the next draft NECP was announced in October of last year, a meeting was held with the plan’s authors at the Polish Chamber of Commerce, where I chair the Energy and Climate Policy Committee. We then presented our comments to Minister Zielińska. These included forecasts for the introduction of nuclear energy in 2033 and the energy production volume in the first years of the nuclear power plant’s operation. It was assumed – excessively, in my opinion – that we would need 308 TWh of energy, while our current demand is 166-168 TWh. Therefore, massive electrification was assumed, at a rate that is unrealistic…
Today marks a year, we have completed further consultations, and, as far as I know, the Minister of Energy will soon present the new NECP to the government, which is to be formally submitted to the European Commission at the end of the year. I think we finally need to adopt it, but it’s crucial that it rationalizes estimates of issues such as production volume and energy demand. A step in this direction has already been taken, as we currently have a target of less than 280 TWh, not 308 TWh. The installed capacity also needs to be verified – the current draft plan estimates it at around 155 GWh, while according to PSE’s plans, we will need 37 GW of regulatory capacity at most in 2040. So the question is: how much of this excess should there be to avoid spending money on sources that will produce very little? We will all bear the cost in transmission fees factored into energy prices…
Let’s return to coal for a moment, but this time let’s try to look beyond the European corner. International Energy Agency (IEA) documents indicate that coal mining will reach a historic peak in 2024, and this year is expected to surpass that record even further. China, to quote a classic Polish author, is holding strong, but so are India and Indonesia. US President Donald Trump has repeatedly announced a coal renaissance. Is the world heading in a different direction than Europe?
As I mentioned, Europe is moving away from fossil fuels because they no longer exist. It has already extracted all the hydrocarbons it could extract. In 2022, after the invasion of Ukraine and the cutting off or restriction of Russian gas, the Netherlands in Groningen considered launching new gas production from local fields. The estimated capacity was around 10 billion cubic meters. However, it quickly became clear that, given the risks of rock bursts and land collapse, the idea had to be abandoned. With the remaining deposits in Europe or Poland, the same scenario could unfold. We no longer have easily accessible coal deposits.
In my opinion, Europe’s interest lies in becoming as independent as possible from hydrocarbon imports. Poland’s raison d’état, however, is to transition to other energy sources by utilizing coal-fired power plants during the transition period—until we have other, equally efficient ones, such as a nuclear power plant. There’s not much of an alternative, as, unfortunately, we don’t have much biomass as a domestic resource. It’s important to plan these changes rationally and in accordance with our own interests. We need to determine by when and in what quantity we will need coal—as attempted in the PEP 2040, which projected that in the “business as usual” scenario, approximately 19 million tons of coal would be needed in 2040, and in the rapid decarbonization scenario, 15.8 million tons of coal. In 2021, we conducted expert research on this topic at the Central Mining Institute, attempting to verify the energy policy assumptions. I believe that determining the extraction volume for 2040 is crucial today. I see around 10 million tons of coal being reduced in this period. Note that Germany is supposed to phase out coal by 2038. We’re about 10 years behind Germany in its energy transformation, so there’s no reason to believe we’ll be able to keep up, especially since we currently lack alternative technologies. As you yourself said, limited access to rare earth resources needed to produce components for energy storage or renewable energy production will also play a role in this process.
We assume that gas and coal will stabilize the energy system during the transition period, but I also want to ask what awaits us when this period ends, in 2040. If the entire energy system is based on renewable sources, which opponents of the Green Deal like to call “weather-dependent,” will it be able to function stably? I’m referring to both the nature of renewable sources and the current stage of technological development in this sector.
If we look at renewable energy sources in general, we will very quickly reach a level of energy production from these sources that meets demand between April and October. However, in the winter months, the current state of development of energy storage technologies may prove problematic. Last year, between the end of November and the beginning of December, we experienced a rotten boom – for about 10 days, solar and wind energy production was very low, below 1,000 MW combined. At that time, the system needed 23-24 GW of power. And these gigawatts had to be supplied from sources we already have, i.e., coal, gas, biomass, etc. We currently lack the capacity to store the energy required in such situations. Hypothetically, if we wanted to store this 23-24 GW for 10 days, 24 hours a day, we would need approximately 500,000 MWh of energy storage capacity. These storage facilities would need to be charged by October at the latest, so that the stored energy could be fed into the system in the following months. This is irrational, it won’t pay off, and no one will do it. We may have several thousand MWh in storage today, maybe we’ll reach a dozen or so, but that’s a drop in the ocean of needs… Nuclear energy will certainly improve the situation, but only after 2040. By then, we’ll have to balance our operations, which means coal-fired power plants should be operational. There may be no more mines in Poland, but new coal-fired power plants will retain the technical capability to operate beyond 2050.
In your speech at the Silesian Museum, you called for a “certain rationality” in the transformation process. How, and if so, can we improve the transformation if an emergency brake is not an option?
Our problem is that the European Union has said goodbye to coal. The mechanisms being prepared for Poland are truly extraordinary. Currently, the main demands regarding the energy sector are to obtain a certain status for power generation capacity, which will lose funding from the capacity market after 2028. Only units emitting less than 550 kg CO2/MWh are to participate in the capacity market, meaning practically all gas-fired units are excluded. Poland applied to the Commission two years ago and obtained an extension for older units until 2028. PSE is currently conducting supplementary auctions, and some older units will receive funding for subsequent years, until 2028. However, it is important to remember that they will operate for approximately 1,000 hours per year or less. To maintain this capacity in the coming years, a different financial mechanism is needed after 2028. If such a unit operates for a tenth of a year, it will not earn its keep. Therefore, we have on the agenda of discussions with the European Commission the introduction of a new balance sheet or strategic reserve mechanism. The second factor is energy prices, which determine the competitiveness of the economy. The European Commission is discussing the introduction of a price corridor for carbon dioxide emission allowances. The idea is to maintain the incentive for decarbonization, but at the same time, to prevent emissions prices from skyrocketing. Currently, the cost of generating one MWh in a coal-fired power plant is approximately PLN 130 for fuel and PLN 300 for emissions allowances. Cheaper energy is possible, and under current conditions, it is possible through self-production by prosumers and energy associations, a reformed ETS, limiting speculation on the price of emission allowances, and the cheapest renewable energy from onshore wind farms.
We talked mainly about Poland, but finally, I’d like to touch on a local perspective and ask… what about Silesia? Silesia, which almost half a century ago was called “the black earth” in the title of Kazimierz Kutz’s film… Will there be life in this black earth after coal?
There’s no shortage of ideas for Silesia’s development. A series of debates on the future, initiated by the Marshal of the Silesian Voivodeship, has just begun. The first thing that really caught my eye was energy. But getting back to the topic, I have this reflection: when I returned from various business trips over the years, I would see, from airplanes, through car windows, or trains, the distinctive smoking chimneys that were the hallmark of Silesia. It was a sight that evoked concern… We all want to live in a friendly climate, free of smoking chimneys and smog. The direction of transformation is right. We just need to conduct it carefully and responsibly, also limiting its impact on families and towns strongly connected to mining. We must strive to complete this transformation process at a reasonable pace – only then will we be able to make it as socially just as possible.
I also believe that there are many positive examples in Silesia where former mining areas and facilities were successfully repurposed and repurposed, while investing in development. I’m thinking here, for example, of the launch of the Katowice Gaming and Technology Hub in the place where the “Wieczorek” Coal Mine was located until recently. This is a completely new technological area. Moreover, advanced technologies are always better implemented in areas with a developed industrial culture, and this is precisely the case of Silesia, which stands out in this respect among other Polish regions.
So, regarding the future, I’m optimistic, but my intuition tells me that the changes taking place cannot be finalized too quickly. Mines and power plants must continue to serve us for some time – they are needed to effectively and relatively safely transform the entire energy system in our country. And in this sense, I disagree with Professor Rzońca that coal is only a thing of the past and a burden for Silesia.
I also believe that Silesia can become a center for new energy technologies. In the region, we have the potential, facilities, and qualifications, for example, for the production of steel components used in wind turbines, the so-called “coal industry.” “Local content” for nuclear energy. It’s easier to launch such production here than to build from scratch in Pomerania. And this is an opening for Silesia in the post-coal era.
Thank you for the interview.
Interview by Marcin Hylewski
If you’re visiting Prague in December, in addition to the traditional visits to the Market Square, Prague Castle, and Golden Lane, you can also visit Wallenstein Gardens or Kozí Placek, located within the Old Town. During this time, a photography exhibition with the telling title “Odcházíme… s hlavou vztyčenou!” (“We leave… with our heads held high!”) will be on display there. This exhibition is a testament to over 200 years of Czech hard coal mining history and the professions associated with it, while also paying tribute to the thousands of workers who have mined coal in Czech mines for centuries.
An era is ending, but not history. OKD is changing its name and moving forward.
The ČSM mine in Stonava, Czech Republic, will cease operations in the first quarter of next year. It is the last “heavy” hard coal-producing mine in the country. After the mine ceases, the planned three-year decommissioning process will begin. The mine was originally scheduled to close at the end of 2022, but a few months before that date, it was decided to extend the mine’s operations until the end of 2025, with the possibility of an extension to 2026.
The miners of the last Czech mine are ending their mining operations with their heads held high. Both from a strictly economic and symbolic perspective. As OKD, the mine’s owner, emphasizes, ČSM mined nearly 3.5 million tons of coal between 2022 and 2024 alone, which was crucial for ensuring the country’s uninterrupted electricity and heat supply amid the energy crisis. It also achieved an operating profit (EBITDA) of over CZK 8 billion and a net profit of over CZK 9 billion, and, through its sole shareholder, paid a dividend of CZK 3.8 billion to the state.
“During this period, OKD achieved excellent financial results, thanks to which it now has the funds to technically decommission the ČSM mine, pay employee severance pay, repair mining damage, and cover the costs of reclamation and subsequent post-mining activities. The state will not have to pay anything for us,” Roman Sikora, Chairman of the OKD Management Board, triumphantly announced, also announcing that the OKD brand will continue to exist, engaging in activities such as the production of energy mixtures, the generation and sale of heat and electricity, the leasing of former mine space, and the construction of a data center.
Mining exhibition tour: from Karviná through Ostrava to Prague
So much for the next few years. Here and now, however, the company’s management is doing everything possible to ensure that the miners leave the stage with dignity, feeling a sense of a job well done and enjoying the respect of not only the residents of the Karviná Basin but also the rest of the country. This is precisely the purpose of the photography exhibition “Odcházíme… s hlavou vztyčenou!” (“We leave… with our heads held high!”), which opened during the traditional September festivities for Miners’ Day in Karviná and was subsequently presented in Karviná, in October and November in Ostrava, and from December in Prague. As reported by the OKD press office, the exhibition will initially be located in the well-known Wallenstein Gardens, where a meeting between miners and representatives of the Czech Senate regarding the end of hard coal mining will also take place, and from December 8th at Kozí plácko in Prague’s Old Town. Let us emphasize, to properly understand the context of this situation: in December, when crowds of visitors from all over the world flock to Prague’s Christmas markets, large-format photographs showing Czech miners at work will be displayed in the Czech capital’s top tourist spots. Dirty, grimy, but above all – as the exhibition’s title explains to viewers – leaving with their heads held high. It’s more or less as if analogous photographs of the “high-flyers” from “Bielszowice” or “Bobrek” were displayed in Warsaw’s Łazienki Park, on Wiejska Street, or near Sigismund’s Column. Prepared by OKD in collaboration with regional photographers (Lukáš Kaboně, Boris Renner, and Petr Chodura), the exhibition aims to commemorate the over 200-year history of hard coal mining in the territory of the present-day Czech Republic and the professions associated with this industry, but also to pay tribute and gratitude to those who were not fortunate enough to return from their shifts.
“If it weren’t for coal, it would be difficult for enterprises such as coking plants, steel mills, rolling mills, power plants, precision machine manufacturing, the chemical industry, and all the extensive infrastructure associated with them to function today. Hard coal is undoubtedly the common denominator of the wealth of the entire region. The fact that its extraction is now ending and we are transitioning to other energy sources is an important milestone in the history of our country,” Roman Sikora, CEO of OKD, emphasized at the September opening.
– Over time, I discover how deeply rooted and complex the world of mining is, not only as a profession, but also as a way of life that has influenced entire generations – said photographer Lukáš Kaboň.
Polish workers were present at the Czech mine until the very end. They will also receive their share of the honors.
It’s worth noting that a few months before the exhibition began its tour of the Czech Republic, OKD published a book with a nearly identical title (“S hlavou vztyčenou”) devoted to disappearing mining professions. Among the professions covered in this publication were those of a coal miner, blaster, foreman, and mine rescuer. Descriptions of individual professions are supplemented by photographs and stories of those who still practice them. Experts from OKD, photographers Boris Renner and Petr Chodura, writer Richard Sklář, and Vladimír Špok, one of the first employees of the ČSM mine, participated in the book’s preparation.
“We already know the date when we will write the final chapter in the history of hard coal mining in the Czech Republic, with which this profession, inextricably linked to mining, will gradually disappear. But we will leave with our heads held high, because we have much to be proud of,” stated OKD’s CEO.
The honors with which Czech miners, who are fading into history, are also shared by our compatriots, who for years worked in considerable numbers in the Karviná-Ostrava mines (at the beginning of the decade, there were around 1,800 of them), sometimes paying top dollar for the coal extracted there. They continued to do so until the very end – OKD, when announcing in June that the last galleries had been completed at the ČSM mine, noted that half of the teams involved were employees of the Bytom-based company Alpex.
Michał Wroński,
journalist at the economic website WNP.PL
Once, when it was forbidden, they disguised themselves as men to work underground. Today, they are often owners or hold prominent positions in the management of mining companies. The role of women in mining has changed many times over the past centuries.
Mining is a male profession. Working in mineral deposits has always required muscular strength and endurance, and therefore predisposed men to it. It also involved risks that women typically prefer to avoid. They performed tedious menial tasks, more monotonous, requiring patience rather than great strength. Women were assigned to jobs designated for unskilled labor. This was the situation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
Women sometimes became mine owners, as was the case in the families of wealthy industrialists. Marie-Anne von Goldschmidt-Rothschild is a case in point. When her father, Fritz von Friedlaender-Fuld, died of cancer on July 17, 1917, she became the sole heir to his estate. It was a considerable fortune, as her father owned the “Eminenz” coal mine near Katowice, as well as the “Emma” (later “Marcel”), “Rymer,” and “Anna” mines in the Rybnik Coal District. During his lifetime, he also owned the Braunkohlen-und Brikett-Industrie AG company, which thrived in Lusatia. His interests also extended to metal ore mining in Norway. Of course, Marie-Anne von Goldschmidt-Rothschild did not personally manage the mines inherited from her father, as that task fell to the estate managers. However, there were few women involved in mining in this way.
Several years after Poland regained independence after World War I, the issue of women’s employment in mining was legally regulated. First, a ban on night work for women was introduced, followed by the adoption of the Act of July 2, 1924, concerning the employment of women and young persons. Article 12 of the Act was unambiguous and devoid of any exceptions: “The employment of women in underground mines is prohibited.” This Act came into effect on December 15, 1924.
It is worth noting that at that time, there were no supranational regulations in this regard. Convention No. 45 of the International Labor Organization concerning the employment of women in underground work in all types of mines was adopted in Geneva on June 21, 1935, and entered into force on May 30, 1937. However, Poland did not ratify it during the Sanation government. There were just over three thousand women working in Polish mining. They were assigned to work on the surface.
The demand for women’s work increased after World War II. This was due to several factors. The country was devastated, and every pair of hands was needed to rebuild the homeland. Many men died in the war or never returned from internment or labor camps. Many were widows and married women who had lost contact with their husbands. The economic situation forced them to take up employment, including in industry and mining. For example, in Nowa Ruda, the local hard coal and fire-resistant shale mine, in the first half of 1947, the crew consisted of 452 men and 134 women. Women therefore constituted over 22% of the crew, a high figure. The average in Polish mining hovered around 9%. Women in the Nowa Ruda mine worked only aboveground, in the washing plant. They separated coal from waste rock. In Polish mines at that time, women were also employed in coal unloading, briquetting, and other surface work. These were difficult and arduous jobs. Miners working in underground workings were sometimes transferred to these jobs as punishment.
Apparently, the presence of a larger number of women in mines than before was treated as an extraordinary transitional situation in the post-war reality. No courses were offered to improve women’s mining qualifications. Indeed, activists took positions in miners’ unions, but their concern was, among other things, to ensure their daughters received appropriate training. A telling excerpt from a press release published on July 11, 1974, by the Silesian Daily People’s Journal is worth quoting: “Currently, in individual mining clubs, special emphasis is placed on the training of miners’ daughters. At the training center at the Dębieńsko mine, 100 girls were trained in cutting, sewing, and housekeeping.” At the CZZG branch in Jaworzno, several dozen girls completed a sewing course.” This clearly shows that in society at the time, including mining families, there was an awareness of the division into typically male and typically female occupations.
Naturally, there were a few exceptions—women who, for various reasons, desired to work underground. Under the law at the time, this was illegal, but—as it turns out—not impossible. The Poznań-based daily Kurier Wielkopolski carried a sensational report on February 23, 1948, titled “Miner Turns Out to Be a Woman.” The report reads: “At the Sośnica mine near Zabrze, miner Kaczmarski was assigned a new assistant, a young boy named Turczyk Gerard, to work on rebuilding the mine tunnel. The boy worked very well, but despite the heat, he never wanted to take off his sweatshirt, as his colleagues did. The case of the young man’s mysterious behavior was soon explained, as it turned out that Gerard Turczyk was Teresa Turczyk from Zabrze.
Three years later, the situation changed dramatically when the Act of February 26, 1951, amending the Act on the Employment of Young Persons and Women, and the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of February 28, 1951, on Work Prohibited to Women were adopted. The pre-war absolute ban on women’s underground employment in mines was lifted. Instead, a ban was introduced on employing women in work that was particularly arduous or harmful to health. In coal mines, this included all work at the mine face, sinking shafts, installing pipes, or laying turnouts. Women were prohibited from working in galleries less than one and a half meters high, or in temperatures above 28°C, or on steep slopes. Significantly, in other mines, women were still not allowed to work underground.
As it turns out, the first women in Polish mines In coal mining, women began working underground shortly before the aforementioned regulations came into force at the end of February 1951, meaning that this was de facto done illegally. Katowice’s “Dziennik Zachodni” newspaper, in its January 24, 1951, issue, reported that two days earlier, on January 22, 1951, women had first gone underground to work at the Bolesław Chrobry Coal Mine in Wałbrzych. The newspaper reported that this was the result of nearly a year of efforts. The author of the report listed by name the women who began their workday at 6:00 a.m. that day. This group included Małgorzata Aulich, Irena Borowiak, Pelagia Capińska, Hanna Deuze, Zofia Dopierała, Lotta Galasz, Gertruda Kamczyk, Anna Karaś, Zofia Kutyla, Stanisława Siutek, Teresa Szewczykowska, and Irena Szuplewska. In the Wałbrzych mine, women were employed in various positions, including pit bottoms, coal transport, and machinery operations. They cited the example of the Soviet Union, where women had already been employed underground. Introducing women to underground work in coal mines was intended as one of the steps toward implementing the Six-Year Plan for Economic Development and the Foundation of Socialism, commonly known as the Six-Year Plan. It covered the years 1950-1955.
In subsequent years, discussions raged about whether to allow women to work underground in iron ore mines as well. In those mines, working conditions were even more difficult, mechanization was less extensive, and work methods were much more primitive than in coal mining. Ultimately, women were not allowed to work underground. In coal mines, however, the first to be transferred underground were usually women who had previously worked above ground, for example, sorting coal. Working underground was often easier for them.
The decision to hire women to work in the underground workings of coal mines had unforeseen consequences. Fights broke out between miners’ wives and women working underground. These fights stemmed from rumors about the immoral behavior of women and men working together underground. Instead of working efficiently, some women spent more time socializing. Furthermore, women, being weaker than men, were more likely to suffer accidents and injuries. They also suffered from illness more frequently, which distorted statistics and hindered the achievement and exceeding of work quotas.
In 1956, women began to be exempted from underground work in coal mines, and on June 15, 1957, Poland ratified Convention No. 45 of the International Labor Organization. Its provisions are worth citing. The first article stated that “For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘mines’ includes any public or private enterprise extracting resources located beneath the surface of the earth,” while the second article stated: “No female person, regardless of age, shall be employed in underground work in mines.” The third article of the convention allowed national legislation to exempt from this prohibition: “a) persons holding a managerial position who do not perform manual work; b) persons employed in the sanitary and social services; c) persons who are students and are assigned to practical training in the underground parts of mines; d) any other persons who occasionally go to the underground parts of mines to perform a non-manual occupation.”
Regardless of the convention’s provisions, individual mines later introduced provisions in their regulations prohibiting women from underground work. The Złoty Stok Arsenic Mine’s regulations, approved on March 9, 1958, stipulated in paragraph thirteen that women were prohibited from all physical work underground, on the ore crusher, or in harsh natural conditions. Nursing mothers were entitled to two half-hour breaks for feeding their children.
Formally, the ban on women’s underground work in the entire Polish mining industry came into effect on March 1, 1959, the moment the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of February 18, 1959, amending the Regulation of February 28, 1951, on work prohibited to women, came into force. This status quo remained in effect for the next fifty years.
In the second half of the 20th century, the level of education in society increased. The number of both women and men with secondary and higher technical education increased. The number of graduates also increased, including in fields such as mining and geology. This led to a significant increase in the number of women working in mines in positions requiring higher levels of expertise. By the early 21st century, women were no longer found only in human resources and accounting positions, but also in positions such as mine geophysics station managers.
After Poland’s accession to the European Union, the Polish authorities were faced with the need to withdraw International Labor Organization Convention No. 45, which prohibits women from working underground in mines. As of February 19, 2007, 97 countries had ratified the Convention, but 13 of them subsequently withdrew. Australia, Chile, Finland, the Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Canada, New Zealand, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, the United Kingdom, and Zambia had so far taken this step. Poland decided to join this group, justifying its decision by the judgment of the European Court of Justice in case C-203/03 Commission v Austria, as Polish legislation in this matter was similar to Austrian legislation.
Therefore, pursuant to the Act of April 15, 2008, on the denunciation of the International Labour Organization Convention No. 45 concerning the employment of women in underground work in all types of mines, adopted in Geneva on June 21, 1935, the President of the Republic of Poland denounced the aforementioned convention on May 28, 2008. Pursuant to Article 7, paragraph 1, of the convention, it ceased to have effect on May 29, 2009. This paved the way for the introduction of appropriate amendments to Polish law, abolishing the ban on women working underground in mines. Furthermore, as of July 25, 2012, Article 8, paragraph 4, point b of the European Social Charter, which also prohibited women from working underground in mines, ceased to bind Poland.
As of 2021, Polska Grupa Górnicza employed 39,270 people, including 35,491 men (90.4%) and 3,779 women (9.6%). At Jastrzębska Spółka Węglowa (Jastrzębska Coal Company), out of 22,303 employees, 20,189 men (90.5%) and 2,114 women (9.5%) were employed in 2021. The vast majority of women in these two largest coal companies in Poland worked aboveground, particularly in office and administration. As of 2024, KGHM Polska Miedź employed approximately 18,000 people, including 93% men and 7% women. Some of these workers can be found underground, for example, in geological work or managing production processes.
What is the situation like in mines that have ceased mining and shifted their focus to tourism? In Wieliczka, both at the “Wieliczka” Salt Mine and its subsidiaries, women constitute 30% of the workforce. There, too, women’s share of underground employment is negligible. Women in Wieliczka work in geological and surveying services, occupational health and safety, as well as in surface work related to mining, such as in the lamp room. They also work as mining equipment mechanics.
Another example is PUT Kopalnia Złota sp. z o.o. in Złoty Stok. The mine’s owner, Elżbieta Szumska, started working there in 1996 as one of two guides guiding tourists underground. There, too, the division is traditional. Heavy mining work, such as replacing support, is performed by men. Many women are among the guides guiding tours of the workings.
Tomasz Rzeczycki
The experiences of municipalities in western Małopolska show that, left to their own devices, water from disused mine workings can incur a hefty price tag for any oversights and misdiagnoses. This is a valuable lesson in the context of the impending end of hard coal mining in Upper Silesia, where hundreds of millions of cubic meters of water are pumped annually to protect the mines. To what extent should this process continue once the last “large” mine has ceased operations, and where – due to the risk of surface flooding – will “perpetual pumping zones” be needed? The Center for Information and Cybersecurity can provide answers to this question.
Flooding, investment problems, and additional costs for municipalities. Water levels are rising at an unforeseen rate.
The coming weeks will mark exactly four years since the shutdown of the main drainage pumps, which had previously drained water from the zinc and lead ore deposits exploited by ZGH “Bolesław” in Bukowno for over 60 years. What might have seemed like industry news to engineers, hydrologists, or mining historians at the time triggered a veritable avalanche of events, the consequences of which now affect thousands of people living in western Małopolska. Water once pumped from the mine, which was discharged into the Sztoła and Biała rivers during mining operations, began to fill (as predicted) the depression cone created by the mining operation, the speed of which proved surprising to everyone. What, according to forecasts, was expected to take decades for nature to unfold, suddenly began to unfold “here and now” before the eyes of a dismayed local community.
Just three months after the Olkusz-Pomorzany Mine’s pumps were shut down, the newly completed Bolesław bypass had to be shut down. The reason? A sinkhole developed near the road. Shortly thereafter, a hole also appeared on the road itself, and then rising groundwater began to flood the road. In February 2023, the road was “temporarily” closed and has remained so to this day, and the prospect of the “podwodnica” – as drivers call the bypass built at a cost of PLN 7.5 million – being passable again seems unlikely. This year, at the end of August, the water level had already reached 308 meters above sea level and was still rising – according to forecasts, the water level will reach approximately 310 meters above sea level, and the resulting floodwater will cover an area of 22 hectares. Less than two years after the Bolesław bypass was closed, the authorities in nearby Bukowno banned access to part of the municipal cemetery. The reason is exactly the same – rapidly rising groundwater levels. And here, too, the situation has remained unchanged to this day. The flooded Bolesław bypass and the cemetery in Bukowno are not the only places where water filling the depression of the former Olkusz-Pomorzany Mine is complicating life for residents. Media reports from this part of the region frequently mention flooded forests, threatened homes, and sinkholes (in April of this year, the Polish Geological Institute – National Research Institute reported the identification of over 1,200 sinkholes in the Olkusz, Bolesław, Bukowno, and Klucze communes, over 200 of which are near residential areas and main roads). It is estimated that reservoirs with a total area of approximately 300 hectares will be built within the 4,134-hectare Bolesław commune.
Investment problems are also emerging. Due to “investment safety,” the tender for the modernization of the Bukowno sewage treatment plant was canceled at the end of last year. It turned out that the groundwater level was significantly higher than when the documentation was prepared, necessitating a review of the design documentation and the preparation of new geological and engineering documentation. The changing hydrological situation also necessitated additional expertise and analyses during the preparation phase for the largest road investment in the history of Olkusz County (the construction of a road leading to the Bukowno Economic Activity Zone). This necessitated design changes regarding the road’s drainage system, led to the suspension of the environmental permit process, and ultimately resulted in an extension of the implementation period.
– New problems related to rising groundwater levels pose a significant threat to the municipality’s existing investment plans. There is a need to introduce new tasks that will significantly limit the financial investment capacity of the city budget, and the implementation of other key investments for the city may be threatened by problems with groundwater – admitted the mayor of the city, Marcin Cockiewicz, in the “Głos Bukowna” newspaper a few months ago. At the beginning of October, Bolesław councilors adopted a resolution addressed to the Prime Minister on providing the commune with “urgent government assistance” (including amending regulations and designating and obliging specific institutions or entrepreneurs to carry out flood protection measures) in order to “minimize the effects of the termination of mining activities” by ZGH Bolesław, with particular emphasis on the negative impact of rising water levels.
The events in Olkusz municipalities serve as a warning for Upper Silesia. It’s time to unearth the experts’ knowledge.
It is in this context that we should consider the announcement of the Information and Cybersecurity Center, which was launched in June within the Upper Silesian Branch of the Polish Geological Institute – National Research Institute. It is intended to be the first structure in Poland that will combine knowledge of geological resources, data obtained from hydrogeological monitoring systems, and predictive analytics tools to secure transformation processes in mining regions.
“This is not just another research facility. It is an operational platform for the region’s environmental security, operating based on hydrogeological models created by the branch’s experts and experience gained in direct collaboration with local governments – including in the municipalities of Bolesław and Bukowno,” explains Artur Dyczko, director of the Upper Silesian Branch of the Polish Geological Institute–National Research Institute.
In parallel to the conceptual work on the Center, a crisis team was established within the Polish Geological Institute–National Research Institute and began collaborating with local governments and services from municipalities in the Małopolska region grappling with the problem of rising groundwater. A hydrogeological model for this area should be developed by the end of this year. Director Dyczko emphasizes that hydrogeological monitoring in western Małopolska was not initiated until after problems related to the closure of the Olkusz-Pomorzany mine became apparent – it had been conducted there for years (as in many other locations across the country). The Institute’s resources included models describing the behavior of water systems in post-mining areas, including the area around Olkusz and the Bolesław Mining and Mining Plant (ZGH Bolesław), and the results of these analyses served as expert knowledge within the scientific community. This is now set to change.
“We must bring this knowledge to the surface and transform it into a tool for protecting people and infrastructure,” emphasizes Artur Dyczko.
The new strategy of the Upper Silesian Branch of the Polish Geological Institute–National Research Institute (PGI–PIB) and the resulting establishment of the Information and Cybersecurity Center are not solely a response to the current problems of western Małopolska. The activities conducted there constitute a “proving ground,” allowing us, on the one hand, to capture the hydrogeological processes currently occurring in the region, and, on the other, to adapt the Institute’s methods, tools, and structure accordingly. All this is done to prepare for potential threats that may emerge after the planned closure of hard coal mining in Upper Silesia over the next quarter of a century.
“Looking at what is happening in Olkusz, Bolesław, and Bukowno, we must also treat it as a warning for Silesia. The flooding in the Olkusz municipalities was not an isolated event. From a hydrological perspective, it is a classic example of the destabilization of water systems following the end of mining and smelting operations.” When the deposit is no longer exploited, the system of water forces and the stresses in the rock mass do not disappear – it begins to live a new, often uncontrolled life – explains Artur Dyczko.
Water pumped from Upper Silesian mines would fill the Racibórz Dolny reservoir in a year
In Upper Silesian municipalities, water conditions disrupted by mining activities are nothing new. This is evidenced by clay pits, often visited by anglers, formed in the place of flooded sinkholes (Bytom’s “Brantka” pond, the city’s largest, has this origin), flooded forest areas, and elements of municipal infrastructure (for example, in Ruda Śląska, at the beginning of this century, due to a subsidence of the terrain, the Bielszowicki Stream flooded the sewage treatment plant and one of the major roads in the southern part of the city, rendering it impassable for several years), or simply by water accumulating in depressions during heavy rains, causing inconvenience to drivers and residents of nearby properties.
What makes this a fundamental difference, however, compared to western Małopolska, are the still-functioning mine drainage systems – both those operating and those already decommissioned. Suffice it to say that the 18 operating pumping stations of the Central Mine Drainage Plant, primarily intended to protect the still-active mines throughout the Upper Silesian Coal Basin from water flowing from decommissioned mines, pump out approximately 100 million cubic meters of water annually, which is more than half the maximum capacity of the Racibórz Dolny flood control reservoir! The territorial scope of this system covers 40 municipalities. Additionally, CZOK operates 39 pumping stations that drain undrained basins located in 11 municipalities, thus protecting land surfaces that have been deformed and subsided due to mining activities, which can lead to flooding during heavy rainfall. And finally, to this balance we must add the water pumped from the ground by the mines that are still operating (studies from the beginning of this decade show data indicating that in the case of PGG, Węglokoks Kraj and the then Tauron Wydobycie, i.e. today’s Południowy Koncern Węglowy, it was over 115 million cubic meters per year).
Who will be responsible for draining the mines when the last mine is closed?
But what happens when the process of decommissioning the Silesian mining industry is complete and there are simply no mines left to protect? And who would bear the costs of further dewatering? A decade ago, the Supreme Audit Office (NIK) indicated that dewatering abandoned mines costs the state budget over PLN 200 million. It also pointed out that a situation where, to protect a mine, water must be pumped from several neighboring mines raises “doubts both about the profitability of this mining method and about the justification for the state budget to bear the costs of dewatering.” It is difficult to imagine that, given the lack of mining, such reservations would not intensify, although the Mine Restructuring Company, within which CZOK has operated for almost a quarter of a century, emphasizes that thanks to changes initiated by CZOK and the simplification of dewatering in decommissioned mines, pumping costs have been reduced.
– The cessation of mining operations in the Upper Silesian Coal Basin, which covers over 3,000 km2. “The situation in Trzebinia (former Siersza Coal Mine) and Bolesław (decommissioned Olkusz-Pomorzany Mine) demonstrates that the operations of the SRK-CZOK Branch must continue not only until the last active mine is operational, but also after the mines are flooded to a safe depth. Even after the mines are closed and flooded to a safe depth, underground and surface preparations will be necessary to determine the most rational methods for collecting and discharging mine water, as well as the possibility of receiving it through surface streams. This also results from Mariusz Tomalik, spokesperson for SRK. “The need to ensure surface protection against the threat of goaf reactivation and the formation of sinkholes,” adds the SRK spokesperson, cautioning, however, that further implementation of the activities previously performed by the Branch (CZOK) will “depend on the decisions and strategy adopted by the ownership bodies of the mining plants.”
“There absolutely can be no ‘it will all work out somehow’ approach here. I believe that the element of safety should be recognized in the transformation process. If, after mine closure, we leave water systems in a state of uncontrolled, spontaneous filling, the consequences could be dramatic: flooding, land subsidence, damage to infrastructure, and a loss of public confidence in the transformation process itself. Transformation can only be safe when accompanied by full geological and hydrogeological exploration and the ability to predict change scenarios. If we want to ensure the region’s stability for decades to come, we must predict the behavior of water and rock mass with the same dedication as previously planned for deposit mining,” emphasizes Artur Dyczko.
It’s worth following the German and Dutch example. We need “perpetual pumping zones.”
For now, however, this topic has not been widely discussed. In its 2024 report, the Polish Geological Institute (PGI-PIB), analyzing the monitoring, research methodology, and assessment of water levels, as well as changes in the drainage of active and decommissioned hard coal mines in the Upper Silesian Coal Basin, explicitly stated that the National Raw Materials Policy until 2050 does not sufficiently address the processes of mine closure and flooding, nor issues related to public safety in post-mining areas. Local government officials in mining municipalities also tend to focus on the social and economic aspects of the transformation, omitting the issue of hydrogeological phenomena, even though these could significantly complicate spatial planning (or call into question already adopted plans).
PGI-PIB representatives point out that the Silesian local government officials’ ambivalence regarding future groundwater levels is based on documents from the beginning of the 2020s, which could definitely benefit from updating. Therefore, they suggest drawing on the experience of the Dutch, who, faced with the challenges of their country’s coastal location, built a water monitoring system utilizing, among other things, advanced 3D hydrogeological models. They also draw attention to events in the Ruhr region in Germany, where, shortly after the closure of the last mine and the cessation of underground water pumping, problems similar to those so familiar to our own country, Poland, emerged. In response, the Germans, with the help of scientists from Poland (including those from the Strata Mechanics Institute of the Polish Academy of Sciences), analyzed data and revised their previous plans, designating “perpetual pumping zones,” or areas where pumps cannot be turned off.
According to Director Dyczko, such “perpetual pumping zones” should also be designated in Upper Silesia, specifying which pumping stations will require modernization, the costs of such measures, and clearly defining who should be responsible for the geological safety process of the transformation. In his opinion, this entity should be the department he heads.
“The branch cannot limit itself to passively providing expertise. We have decided to become an institution active in the transformation process – capable of monitoring, predicting, and proposing security measures at the level of municipalities, counties, and entire post-mining areas. We aspire to serve as a permanent partner for local administration, state institutions, and investors,” he explains.
A key element of this new model is the Geoinformation and Cybersecurity Center, which, on the one hand, would constitute a comprehensive database of rock mass, water, and post-mining systems (data collected from mining companies would be subject to cybersecurity as critical infrastructure and made available to local governments and state institutions in a controlled manner). On the other hand, it would conduct predictive modeling, using algorithms to predict changes in post-mining areas, in both short-term scenarios (e.g., flooding) and long-term scenarios (e.g., changes in water flow directions or the risk of deformation).
“The Center is intended to be not only a research facility but also a regional geological security hub. We decided that its task is to provide risk maps, models for specific municipalities, and support investment decision-making during the transition period. If we are to talk about responsible transformation, someone must ensure the geological and hydrogeological stability of the environment,” summarizes Director Dyczko.
Michał Wroński
Journalist at the economic website WNP.PL
