The sudden surge in gas prices, signals of insufficient supply of the raw material in the biomass market, the slow pace and uncertainty surrounding geothermal projects, and the public controversy surrounding the construction of waste incineration plants indicate that decarbonizing the heating sector will be difficult to achieve in a revolutionary manner. Rather, we need to be prepared for a long-term process requiring the broadest possible diversification of the mix. Being at the forefront of change may require facing many unexpected situations.
Just six months ago, I wrote in these pages about the inevitable shift in the heating industry (and already clearly visible today) away from hard coal as its primary fuel in favor of other fuels (e.g., biomass or waste). This trend is fueled on the one hand by rising CO2 emission allowance prices, which are severely impacting the sector’s finances and translating into rising heating bills for consumers; on the other, by the low efficiency of conventional heating; and on the third, by the stream of public funds invested in technologies using alternative fuels.
None of the three circumstances mentioned above have disappeared over the past few months. They continue to shape the decarbonization trend in the heating sector, best evidenced by reports of the difficult financial situation of many heating companies operating on coal. However, the pace of this process is by no means uniform; the market situation has recently been (to put it euphemistically) very “dynamic,” and the adopted assumptions are constantly being challenged by reality, and this verification does not always fully confirm the initial assumptions. Sometimes it turns out that even in the era of decarbonization, it is beneficial to have coal in the mix, as it can act as a reserve to stabilize production in the event of disruptions with other fuels.
Without coal, things can get hectic. And very cold at the same time.
“With coal, I’ve never experienced such emotions that I was worried about the continuity of heat production in winter, while with biomass, such situations have unfortunately occurred over the years,” admitted Janusz Fic, president of the Municipal Public Utilities Company – Krosno Municipal Holding, honestly and without mincing words. This admission was made during a September seminar on the energy transformation of Polish cities, organized by the Association of Polish Cities as part of the Local Development Forum.
As usual at such events, much was heard about the need for decarbonization, and in this regard, the president of the Krosno municipal company did not contradict the “official” interpretation. The Holding he manages is systematically implementing this approach, reducing the share of hard coal in the mix, with the goal of permanently phasing it out by 2024 (for comparison, as recently as 2012, all the heat generated by the company came from burning coal). KHK has consistently focused on biomass for nearly a decade, and the new “green” mix will be supplemented by municipal waste from nearly 30 municipalities in the Podkarpacie region, which is currently being constructed (the incinerator is scheduled for completion by 2024 at a cost of PLN 135 million). Despite all these efforts, the president of the Fic is not a huge fan of biomass, which he describes as a rather “unrewarding” fuel and lists its shortcomings in one breath: storage difficulties, the need for a sufficiently large warehouse, and the loss of performance over extended periods (all of which translates into difficulties in accumulating significant reserves). The main challenge, however, is the shallow and unstable market, which means that the coal-fired heating plant, dating back to the 1980s and theoretically intended solely as a “peak source,” has suddenly become a strategic reserve.
“Last winter, sawmills essentially stopped production, and we were generating heat from storage.” “We reached the point where we were relying on a coal-fired boiler because we simply didn’t have any biomass. Obtaining it was impossible. Fortunately, everything unblocked at the last minute, so the ORC boiler was still operational,” the president of the Krosno-based company told the local government officials attending the seminar.
His further explanation revealed that this entire situation wasn’t an accidental “occupational accident,” but a logical consequence of the market balance. According to Fico, this market balance is clearly unfavorable to biomass buyers. The terms are dictated by producers, who are relatively few in number compared to those interested in their offerings, leaving no room for serious price negotiations or for the imposition of penalties.
“We don’t have as strong a position in our relationships with our suppliers as we did with coal. We’re not protected by any contractual penalties. What we have in our contracts is a last-ditch threat, which we’ve only used once over the years, and that was to intimidate, not to enforce,” admitted the president of Fic. He added that there are so few potential biomass suppliers that any potential conflict with them wouldn’t make much sense in the long run, because even if we win these disputes, we could simply be left without fuel in the future.
“Our experience is, in a sense, a warning,” said Janusz Fic, referring to subsequent investments in biomass boiler plants, currently underway or planned across Poland.
To what extent is the situation outlined by the representative of the Krosno company representative representative of the entire sector? This installation is one of the longest-operating in the country, so its managers have had ample time to research the market, and Podkarpacie itself isn’t a region that might be suspected of lacking forest biomass. Industry media reports indicate that rising fuel prices, as well as demand from the commercial power and heating sectors, are a fact. On the other hand, a report published at the end of September by the Jagiellonian Institute and the American Pellet Industry Association (USIPA) argues that biomass can be a good complement to the fuel mix in heating, serving as a “scalable source of renewable energy.” The report even encourages the conversion of large European power plants and combined heat and power plants to this fuel, arguing that a one-for-one coal-to-biomass swap allows the utilization of existing assets that would otherwise have to be decommissioned.
The French company will wait a bit longer to bring in gas. Prices for the blue fuel are soaring.
Also in the fall, news of a sudden “warming” in coal prices came from Olsztyn. To be clear, the capital of Warmia has consistently implemented a policy of reducing the use of this fuel in its heating system for years, seeking to mitigate rising costs (this year alone, the local municipal heating authority (MPEC) has raised heating prices twice). A biomass boiler plant was commissioned two years ago, and the construction of an oil-and-gas boiler plant is scheduled to be completed by the end of this year, and in 2023, heat from the waste incineration plant currently under construction is scheduled to flow to the radiators. At the same time, however, the company is modernizing its coal boilers, meaning it has no intention of completely abandoning coal.
The Michalin Group’s Olsztyn plant will also continue to use coal for at least one more heating season. This is significant news, as the Michalin plant’s boiler plant supplies heat to approximately 30% of Olsztyn’s population of over 170,000. Exactly a decade ago, representatives of the French company announced that in 2021 they would cease using coal fuel, replacing it with gas. This change was intended to also mean the end of heat sales to the city, which was one of the factors motivating the local government to develop its own heating sources. However, at the end of September, it turned out that these plans were suddenly revised, and the parties agreed to extend their cooperation by one year.
“Michalin is extending the possibility of selling heat energy to Olsztyn for another year. We have signed a one-year contract with them for heat supplies up to 30 MW. This will be a significant addition to the system, whose total demand exceeds 250 MW,” explained Olsztyn Mayor Piotr Grzymowicz in an interview with PortalSamorzadowy.pl.
As could be heard unofficially, the argument for this decision was the rapidly rising gas prices, which made hard coal, which was becoming more expensive and burdened with emission fees, appear as a solution (even temporarily) more financially affordable than the “blue fuel”.
Local government officials have been pushing for eco-friendly heating sources. Now they fear for their credibility.
The gas market situation has given local governments in other regions of Poland much food for thought. Perhaps the loudest alarm was raised by local government officials from some municipalities in Greater Poland, who – like their residents – saw their bills in October show amounts 100% higher than they had just a few weeks earlier. (In fact, the price of gas alone increased by approximately 170%, which, with fixed and distribution fees remaining unchanged, ultimately resulted in a doubling of bills.) The supplier cited rising wholesale natural gas prices and the need to adjust its rates to market conditions. He also pointed out that competitors’ rates were also not stagnating, but this didn’t particularly reassure anyone. “We will have to reckon with higher maintenance costs for schools, public facilities, etc. in our municipality, and when planning next year’s budget, this significant expense will have to be taken into account, not to mention adjusting this year’s budget,” pointed out Paweł Adam, mayor of the town and municipality of Buk (Poznań County). He warned that as a result of such a significant price increase, residents – due to the expense of paying gas bills – will have no money for other basic needs. He also emphasized the environmental aspect of this entire situation.
“We encouraged residents to replace their heating sources – to replace the old ‘smokers’ with ecological heating sources, like gas. Now what? This is how we lose the credibility and trust of our residents,” complained the mayor, who, along with a group of several dozen local government officials representing municipalities in Greater Poland, Western Pomerania, Lower Silesia, the Pomeranian Voivodeship, and the Kuyavian-Pomeranian Voivodeship, formed a protest committee and intervened, among other things. in the Energy Regulatory Office, the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection or at the level of ministries, in order to clarify whether in this case the gas supplier is not taking advantage of its monopolistic position on the market (however, by the time this material is completed, nothing has changed in this matter, which suggests that it will end with a media frenzy, and higher bills will have to be paid anyway).
Coal prices also increased on a macro scale
The emerging shift from gas to coal on a local scale was also signaled on a macro scale by energy market analysts. As early as June, experts from the Swiss-based Axpo Solutions pointed out that coal consumption in Europe had jumped by 10-15% this year, as a colder and longer-than-usual winter depleted gas reserves, and the rising energy demand following the pandemic trough must be met somehow (meanwhile, Europe must compete with Asia for Russian gas). Analysts emphasized that although CO2 emission rates have reached record levels, they are often secured at a fixed level years in advance, meaning that using coal, though expensive, can still be profitable. Such reports proliferated in the following months as gas prices continued to climb. At the beginning of October, prices surpassed $1,300 per 1,000 cubic meters, marking a 550 percent increase since the beginning of the year!
Michał Wroński, journalist at PortalSamorzadowy.pl
Industrial-scale coal mining in Great Britain began around the 16th century. By 1600, the northeastern English coalfields of Northumberland and Durham were supplying over 250,000 tons of coal annually, primarily to southern England.
By 1912, the British coal industry had reached its peak, employing 1,100,000 workers and producing a record 287 million tons, a third of which was exported. At that time, there were approximately 1,400 mining companies and 2,600 operating mines. In 1947, the industry was nationalized, employing 718,000 workers in 958 mines.
Although coal remained the country’s primary fuel for another decade, declining demand from the late 1950s onward caused the National Coal Board (NCB), the state-owned coal company, to close an average of 34 mines per year between 1958 and 1973. By 1975, only 241 mines remained operational. By the end of 1985, this number had fallen to 133, and by 1992, only 50 mines were operational, employing 43,800 people.
When discussing the restructuring of the hard coal mining industry in this country, it is important to clearly distinguish between two periods.
The first period, from 1947 to the late 1970s, was a period of declining domestic demand for coal and growing competition from other energy sources. During this period, the only effective means of mitigating the effects of job cuts was the transfer of workers from one mine to another.
The second period, from 1980 to 1995, was driven primarily by the then-government’s privatization policy. While previous mine closures were often associated with resource depletion or massive geological problems, the subsequent restructuring stemmed directly from the government’s requirement that the National Central Bank achieve financial independence without the need for state subsidies. Furthermore, there was also a political dimension. The Conservative government’s policy aimed to break the power of the National Miners’ Union and expose the industry to market forces as a prelude to final privatization. When the Conservative government regained power in 1979, it began the de facto privatization of all previously state-owned industries, including hard coal mining.
The 10-month coal strike of 1984-85 proved disastrous for the industry. It began in defense of 20,000 jobs at twenty mines and ended with a split in the National Union of Mineworkers. The cost of these strikes was estimated at £1.75 million for the National Coal Corporation (NCB), plus a further £1.50 million for the government and the major buyers of British coal. Despite an accelerated program of closures of unprofitable mines in the mid-1980s, the NCB, which changed its name to British Coal Corporation (BCC) in 1987, was still able to make significant investments in mines it saw as having a future, although the bulk of this investment was in technology, not human resources. At the end of 1992, the government announced its intention to close 27 of the 50 remaining mines, and to retain a further four on a resource-saving basis.
The coal industry, which returned to the private sector in early 1995, consisted of 31 deep mines, some of which remained dormant. At that time, it employed fewer than 9,000 people. By the beginning of 2000, 17 deep mines remained operational, providing employment for 9,400 people, of whom 8,100 miners worked in England, 700 in Scotland, and 600 in South Wales.
The government’s approach to economic regeneration in areas affected by coal industry restructuring was largely regional. However, this only occurred from the late 1990s, when regional policy emerged in government programs. Previously, central government assumed responsibility for all matters. The exceptions were Wales and Scotland, for which the United Kingdom central government created dedicated departments: Welsh and Scottish. Thus, the responsibility for attracting new investment to the old coalfields during the 1980s and 1990s often fell on existing organizations that had broader interests than just the coal industry. British Coal Enterprise (BCE) shouldered the brunt of British Coal’s efforts to prepare its former workers for alternative employment.
BCE was established in late 1984 to support the creation of alternative employment opportunities in coalfields. It was an initiative undertaken by British Coal and the central government (then the Department of Energy), without the involvement of any trade union. It was established as a wholly owned subsidiary of BCC. It began operations on a modest scale with a limited budget of £5 million. By the early 1990s, its capital had reached £60 million (US$100 million).
The nature and results of BCE’s operations have shown that long-term operations should indeed be pursued to create new jobs to replace those lost in the coal industry.
The primary goal of British Coal Enterprise was to support the economic recovery and diversification of the UK’s coalfields, primarily creating jobs outside the coal sector, but within the coalfield.
Its relocation services for former miners were free for BCC employees. The company also offered commercial services to other businesses, both within and outside the coalfields. It was organized on a regional basis, corresponding to the seven BCC mining areas, each in a different coalfield.
BCE aimed to create new jobs by attracting new business to the coalfields and by providing support to new businesses, encouraging them to relocate to the coalfields or expand their operations. It achieved this through:
Financial assistance was available to any newly established business, expanding its scope of operations, or relocating to mining areas that created new, permanent jobs without eliminating existing jobs at other businesses in the area.
The financial assistance offered was contingent on job creation, and the loan amount was directly related to the number of jobs created. For each anticipated new job, BCE could provide up to £5,000, or up to 25% of the necessary funding for the business. The conditions these businesses had to meet to qualify for BCE funding were as follows:
The BCE’s financial role proved invaluable for business start-ups, as once a business had secured BCE support, it was often easier to secure further financial assistance from other commercial sources.
By 1994, BCE had invested a total of £85 million in the development of approximately 4,300 projects, with a total funding of £718 million, reflecting the principle that £1 financed by BCE attracted a further £7.50 from other sources. By 1993, BCE had written off 9% of its loans as uncollectible, and a further 22% were held by companies experiencing “financial difficulties.”
As part of its program and its concern for the overall local economy, which included promoting job creation, BCE established active relationships with various agencies that sought to stimulate the regeneration of mining areas. These agencies included local governments, regional offices of national government departments, chambers of commerce, and training and enterprise boards.
From BCE’s perspective, the most important of these were the Local Enterprise Agencies. These were not-for-profit partnerships in which, together with banks and large local companies, BCE played a direct role in the restructuring process and provided financial assistance. These agencies provided business advisors to companies wishing to establish or expand operations in mining areas. Between 1985 and 1993, BCE allocated over £6 million for this activity.
BCE engaged in the creation and support of workshops and small businesses, which it managed, having access to a vast pool of mine buildings and, in some cases, buildings belonging to other companies that could be used for this purpose. Small businesses were established on these premises. BCE also engaged, often with other agencies, in the construction of new facilities. This type of assistance meant that new entrepreneurs were not immediately exposed to high capital outlays, and using basic office services did not require them to commit additional capital to securing their own facilities. By mid-1994, BCE planned to have 790 such units in 41 locations, committing an annual investment of £15-17 million.
In addition to providing low-interest loans to new or expanding businesses in the coalfields, BCE also supported other financing initiatives and provided guided workshops and industrial infrastructure from which new companies could be established. BCE also assumed responsibility for implementing British Coal’s Job and Career Change Scheme (JACCS), which provided advice and training for former miners. Between 1987 and 1993, BCE established 2,000 “job shops” (career advice offices) as part of the BBC’s JACCS program.
The services provided at these “workshops” included career counseling, job search methods, CV preparation, interview techniques for job applications, and retraining advice.
Over 106,000 “job opportunities” were created at costs ranging from £440 ($700) per job to £1,180 ($1,900) for each new job placement, all-inclusive, plus £1,570 ($2,500) for BCE’s credit services. At the time, BCE claimed to have created 46,000 jobs within the areas of operations BCE supported, 13,600 in the area where BCE could provide premises in former mine buildings, and 46,000 jobs through the JACCS Job and Career Transition Program (JACCS).
The JACCS program focused primarily on matching vacancies with the skills of former miners. It should be noted that the level of training among the miners was low. Training was used when it was considered likely to lead to a new job or when such training was offered “while gaining experience” by a new employer. Some former British Coal employees were encouraged to start their own businesses. Business plans were then prepared and financial assistance was provided. In some cases, applications for financial assistance were submitted directly to BCE.
It is claimed that BCE created between 7,000 and 24,000 jobs, but the most common estimate is 16,000 jobs. Using this estimate, the cost of creating one new job was re-evaluated, ranging from £4,300 for the physical workstation ($6,900) to £16,600 ($26,550) for the actual provision of the new job, including training. These costs, it was claimed, were in good agreement with the costs of creating new jobs through other agencies.
Following the privatization of the coal sector in early 1995, organizations like BCE were either sold separately to the private sector or went out of business. Responsibility for former mining sites in England that were suitable for remediation and potential development was transferred to another state agency, English Partnerships, which acquired 56 sites of varying sizes with the goal of remediating them and returning them to the most appropriate use. In 1998, Regional Development Agencies were established. Their role was to coordinate incoming investment, improve workforce skills, improve economic competitiveness, and generally revitalize the areas for which they were responsible. Furthermore, the government established the Coalfields Regeneration Trust, whose mission was to support local initiatives, such as establishing small workshops and establishing credit unions. Initially planned for England, this initiative also expanded to Scotland and Wales. Britain’s access to European Union funds became possible only after its accession to the European Community (1975). Until the mid-1990s, the UK’s former coalfields were covered by the European Regional Structural Funds. In the late 1990s, two coalfields – South Yorkshire and South Wales – were added to this scope.
However, changing priorities within the EU led to a reduction in aid for some UK coalfields, and some even lost access. The UK was also a major recipient of European Union funds under the RECHAR programme, receiving approximately £300 million ($470 million). ECSC funding for British Coal to cover the costs of retraining under Article 56 of the Treaty amounted to £53 million ($85 million) between 1985 and 1994, while ECSC grants to the British government totaled ECU 212 million ($235 million).
Between 1950 and 1980, the reduction in employment associated with mine closures was addressed through initiatives that included voluntary redundancy, early retirement, and internal transfers within the National Bank of England (NCB). Approximately 60-70% of employees took redundancy, while the remainder chose to transfer to another mine. Alternative employment was typically offered at mines within the same coalfield, and where such opportunities were unavailable, miners were offered jobs in other parts of the United Kingdom.
Miners transferred to another mine were provided with assistance in the form of a one-time severance payment upon commencement of employment, followed by further payments after six, twelve, and twenty-four months of service at the new mine. The maximum amount in this case was £5,000. Further payments could be made in the form of allowances for costs such as relocation, house sale, rent increases at the new workplace, or renting out an apartment. These forms of financial assistance played a significant role in ensuring miners’ cooperation with the restructuring process. For those who took redundancy payments due to job loss (the vast majority) rather than transferring to another mine, these measures mitigated the effects of unemployment, although they did nothing to create alternative employment.
The voluntary early retirement scheme, proposed by the BCC and operating until 1990, offered miners aged 60 or over the opportunity to receive a lump sum payment and continue receiving unemployment benefits until they reached the normal retirement age of 65. This age was later reduced to 50, and the scheme was subsequently abandoned by the BCC as a more generous retirement package was introduced. The total cost of early retirement payments between 1967 and 1987 was £2.6 billion, plus the annual cost of administering the scheme, which was £60 million. The total cost of all early retirement and redundancy payments between 1985 and 1995 reached almost £6,600 million, of which almost £160 million came from the ECSC.
For many years, miners benefited from the Redundant Mineworkers’ Payment Scheme (RPMS), which was very generous compared to schemes available in other sectors. However, the terms of this scheme were changed in the late 1980s. From 1 January 1990, employees received redundancy pay equal to three weeks’ earnings per year of service, with a maximum rate of £300 per three weeks, based on a maximum of 30 years of service. Under these terms (which included all statutory entitlements), the maximum payment was £27,000. In addition, there was an age-related lump sum payment ranging from £2,500 (if the employee was 21) to £10,000 (for those aged 30 and over). There were also coal allowance entitlements (or the option to take a lump sum payment for coal allowance) for those aged 50 and over.
Following the privatization of the UK coal industry, parts of the BCE located in various coalfields were also sold to the private sector.
Where reclaimed mining land previously owned by the BCC was used for new economic activity, EU funds for the economic regeneration of brownfield sites were also provided to develop new jobs on such land, up to 40% of the cost of adapting such sites for new economic activity.
In 1997, the Labour government appointed the Coalfields Task Force to report on the socio-economic situation in the UK coalfields and formulate practical action plans to assist communities affected by mine closures. The information gathered by the task force was published in mid-1998, and based on this information, the government presented a 10-year recovery program for coalfield communities. The measures included:
In accordance with European Commission decisions, £86,942,000 in public aid was granted to cover operating losses at existing mines in 2000, and £46,350,500 in 2001 for the same purposes. In 2002, the UK coal industry received public aid approved by the European Commission, amounting to £81,087,810, including £10 million for social assistance for miners leaving mines within the Selby complex and £60 million for investment projects in mines with promising future profitability. Between 2003 and 2008, £173.1 million in public aid was also granted to the coal sector.
In 1994, the Coal Authority was established under the Coal Industry Act. This office has taken over the management of legacy impacts from past coal mining, including claims for damages related to subsidence, for which licensed operators of former coal mines are not responsible. It also deals with minewater issues and other issues left behind by mining operations. It also owns (on behalf of the country) most of the UK’s coal reserves and has the authority to grant coal mining licenses.
The lessons that can be drawn from the experience of restructuring the UK coal industry are as follows:
Zygmunt Borkowski
Close, getting closer? An agreement regarding the Turów mine is within reach. But the truth is that the new government being formed in the Czech Republic doesn’t necessarily have to be to Poland’s advantage. In the background, our energy security, jobs for thousands of Poles, and huge business interests are at stake.
The Czechs want more?
Anna Moskwa, the new climate minister, offers a chance for a new beginning in the Turów dispute. Because if you don’t know what’s going on, it’s about money.
A huge fine, significantly larger than the fine the ECJ imposed on Poland for continued mining at the Turów mine. As a reminder, it’s €500,000 for each day the mine operates.
The Polish side received new proposals from the Czechs in the first half of November.
“We agreed with the Czech government that at this stage of the talks, we want to speak directly to each other, not through the media,” says Aleksander Brzózka, spokesperson for the Ministry of Climate and Environment.
Behind the scenes, we have been holding more than a dozen rounds of meetings and talks, which have so far reached a deadlock. The point concerns the duration of the agreement.
The Czechs assume that the agreement should remain in force even after the mine is closed for various reasons. This could be as long as halfway through this century.
There is also another issue, raised by trade unions, among others. The Czechs are demanding the introduction of independent observers to the Polish mine, who will have access and the ability to verify the impact of the mine’s operation on the environment.
Let’s recall the origins of the problem.
Last year, Michał Kurtyka, then Minister of Climate and Environment, extended the lignite mining license in Turów for another six years, until 2026.
The Czechs, who have long complained about the mine’s supposedly disastrous environmental impact, decided to act. They filed a complaint with the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). They requested an order – as an interim measure – to suspend mining at the mine. The complaint was filed in connection with the mine’s expansion, which – according to the Czech side – threatens access to water for residents of nearby municipalities. They also complain about noise and dust associated with lignite mining.
The CJEU ordered the immediate suspension of coal mining in Turów in May of this year. In September, it announced that Poland would pay a daily fine of €500,000 for failure to comply with the decision.
We are fighting for the truth.
The Czech side’s claims about the lack of water resulting from the exploitation of coal deposits in Turów are unfounded, argues Deputy Minister of Climate and Environment Piotr Dziadzio.
Poland has filed a complaint against the CJEU’s decision with the same institution.
During a recent hearing, Dziadzio argued: “We have a number of analyses and studies that indicate that these arguments are too far ahead of the facts,” the deputy minister emphasized.
Unofficially, Polish negotiators admit that Poland made a mistake by disregarding the issue of talks with the Czech side.
So we have a problem, but as they admit, if the Turów case continues without an agreement, Poland may file a complaint similar to the Czech one. This concerns the negative environmental impact on the Polish side from a mine in Germany, owned by… a Czech owner.
The case was reported by money.pl. The portal concerns the Jänschwalde mine, currently owned by the Czech company EPH. The open-pit mine covers an area of 80 square kilometers. Coal from it is fed to the Jänschwalde power plant. The Turów mine covers approximately 24 square kilometers.
There are many more similar lignite mines in the region where Turów mines. And the vast majority of them operate in… the Czech Republic and Germany.
No one wants a hardening of stance and a lack of agreement – but if the Czechs persist, we will act – Polish politicians say unofficially.
Morawiecki toughens up
“It’s difficult for us to change our decision and close 4-7% of our power system,” Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said recently, commenting on the decision to close Turów.
“There are limits to reasonable decisions that can and should be considered, but some decisions simply exceed any capacity or acceptability from a social, economic, and in this case, energy security perspective,” Morawiecki emphasized.
“I’m asking the Court of Justice in Luxembourg: do you want people to freeze in winter, to be deprived of electricity during the winter months? I, as Prime Minister, certainly cannot agree to such a thing,” the Polish Prime Minister says emphatically.
As the Polish side argues, the minister’s decision extending the lignite mining license in Turów, which the Czech side is complaining about, was issued based on a provision exempting the company from the requirement to obtain an environmental permit.
The environmental permit was issued by the relevant Regional Directorate for Environmental Protection (RDOŚ) before the license was extended, both until 2026 and the subsequent extension until 2044, the Ministry of Climate and Environment emphasizes.
Why can’t Turów be closed?
The mine supplies fuel to the nearby power plant owned by PGE. Without its extraction, the energy sector wouldn’t be able to generate energy.
Of course, lignite can be imported. But the immediate question is the cost. Not just the fuel itself.
The mine and power plant provide thousands of jobs. They provide stability for the region. They also, and perhaps above all, provide energy security for a large part of Poland.
In theory, precisely because of energy security, a single-member Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decision should not be issued. That’s the theory. Practice has shown otherwise.
We believe that the CJEU’s actions in this case have no legal basis in the treaties. We believe this action exceeds the Court’s powers, and we have consistently raised this legal argument to ensure that no such measures can be applied to Poland,” Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Paweł Jabłoński said in November.
The Turów mine and power plant are owned by PGE Górnictwo i Energetyka Konwencjonalna, part of PGE Polska Grupa Energetyczne.
Jarosław Adamski
