Hard coal resources in Spain were concentrated in two main areas: the Asturias–León basin in the north and the Ciudad de Badajoz Real basin in the south–central part of the country. Lignite resources, on the other hand, occur southeast of the Pyrenees. After a gradual reduction in coal production between 1950 and 1975, production rose sharply in the late 1970s. This was due to the Spanish government’s desire to reduce dependence on oil supplies. Until 1975 and the restoration of the democratic multi–party system, the Spanish government intervened heavily in coal production, sales price structures, and energy price structures. This centralist management system was later abandoned.
Coal production was carried out by 52 private enterprises (except for one). As a result of the privatization of ENDESA, the only state–owned enterprise is HUNOSA, which took over the Minas de Figaredo company in 1998. Eight companies produced approximately 1 million tons of coal annually: ENCASUR, HUNOSA, ENDESA GENERACION, Coto Minero del Sil, Hullera Vasco–Leonesa, Minero Siderurica de Ponderrada, Miner Catalano Argonesa, and Union Minera del Norte. Ten other enterprises produced within the range of 100,000 tons per year.
Transition and early restructuring efforts
In the early 1980s, concerns about energy supply led the government to promote domestic coal production. For instance, state investments in the industry in 1984 amounted to 370 million USD, though most of these funds were allocated to preserving employment and improving infrastructure. Spain’s accession to the European Union in 1986 brought both benefits and limitations resulting from membership in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The Third National Energy Plan (Plan Energetico Nacional), introduced in 1984, envisaged continuous growth in coal production and provided ongoing subsidies mainly intended to preserve existing jobs as Spain began its integration into the EU. Since private companies were generally small, the focus of restructuring discussions is primarily on HUNOSA.
At the time of its establishment, HUNOSA employed 18,750 people. Three years later, after acquiring several private companies, employment rose to 20,600. Until the early 1980s, employment remained at approximately 21,000 people. At that time, the Spanish coal industry still benefited from significant investments aimed at securing energy supply and preserving jobs. However, by 1987, HUNOSA’s losses reached a level where a change in employment strategy became necessary. Proposals for gradual employment reduction initially met with sharp reactions from trade unions. In the early 1990s, HUNOSA closed 10 mines (though this represented a loss of only 1 million t/y in production potential) and launched a business diversification program.
Social and economic challenges in Asturias
HUNOSA’s production plants were located south and southeast of Oviedo, the capital of the Asturias province. Between 1987 and 1997, the population of this province decreased by 25,000, and problems in the agricultural sector, combined with the restructuring of heavy industry sectors, led to unemployment reaching 17.3%. This was significantly higher than the Spanish average of 14% at the time. Since its creation in 1967, HUNOSA had managed to rebuild production potential to a maximum of 4.6 million tons per year in 1972. Since then, production has gradually declined. Job losses during this period were significant: out of 19,000 workers who left the coal industry over 33 years, 10,000 lost their jobs between 1991 and 1999.
Mining conditions in the area were difficult (steeply inclined seams), making the introduction of high–efficiency extraction systems rare. Although HUNOSA managed to increase the share of mechanized production, labor productivity remained very low. Like the rest of the Spanish hard coal industry, HUNOSA relied on state subsidies to maintain operations. For example, in 2000, HUNOSA received 90.7 million USD after prior approval by the European Union. Following Spain’s entry into the EU, political pressure increased for the coal industry to become more competitive. This was reflected in the employment reduction plan provided for in a three–year program agreed upon with the government in 1985—despite union resistance. Production cuts in the 1980s led to employment dropping to 17,500 by 1991, amidst persistent union opposition (including miners’ demonstrations in Madrid in 1992). Despite this, the industry cut another 3,200 jobs. Between 1991 and 1999, HUNOSA reduced employment by 10,000, closing the least profitable underground mines and limiting open–cast mining due to environmental pressure. Over a 32–year period, employment in the company fell from 26,600 to 7,500 people.
National coal plans and state aid
In 1998, the government, unions, coal producers, and other parties signed a New Coal Plan covering the period up to 2005. This agreement guaranteed financial support for the industry, not only through direct subsidies but also by funding the development of alternative employment in coal basins. The plan established a schedule for gradual reductions in employment and production. The Plan for Hard Coal Mining and Alternative Development of Mining Areas (1998–2005) set criteria for continued state subsidies, which were to decrease in value while employment and extraction were steadily reduced. The plan also envisaged significant investments in infrastructure, financial aid for new economic units, and education. State aid was primarily directed at: · limiting mining production capacity, · covering mine operating losses, · social benefits for departing miners, · aid for mining municipalities, · mitigating the effects of mining operations.
The social protection program funded early retirement: miners could retire at a “calculation age” of 52 (where 1 year of work at the face equals 1.5 calculation years); the average retirement age was 45. Before reaching this age, miners were directed to other work, such as in mining municipalities. The statistical cost of losing one mining job was approximately 60 million pesetas (390,000 USD). Key European Commission decisions between 1987 and 2002 approved this aid for covering losses, investment, innovation, and environmental protection. For the year 2002 alone, the Spanish hard coal sector received 1,067,266,860 EUR in approved state aid for operating costs, reduction of activities, and extraordinary expenses.
Job creation and vocational training
The requirement for job creation was based on the principle that a mining company creates four new jobs for every eleven lost. This formula did not strictly apply to HUNOSA, which had a specific goal of creating 736 new mining jobs and 325 non–mining jobs. If HUNOSA failed to create the non–mining jobs, it was obliged to create them within mining. In 1988, SODECO was established to attract investment to mining areas. In 1993, FUCOMI was founded to provide training services across the region. In 1999, HUNOSA created SADIM to provide capital for alternative economic activities and market high–tech services like cartography.
Training was a crucial element. FUCOMI introduced specialized training for young people (ages 16–25) in skills required by construction, metal, office, and forestry industries. Training workshops (Escuelas talleres) and vocational centers (Casas de Oficios) provided practical experience. Participants received 75% of the national minimum wage. Funding came from the national government, the Asturias government, and the EU. SODECO also attracted investments worth over 102 million USD by the end of 1999, creating nearly 1,800 jobs. Business centers were designed to facilitate small companies by offering subsidized space and consulting.
The final phase and the Just Transition Strategy
In 2010, “coal decrees” were introduced to promote domestic coal in the electricity sector until 2014, maintaining a 7.5% share in the energy mix. However, in 2013, the government agreed to reduce subsidies until their total withdrawal. The Framework Plan 2013–2018 aimed at closing 26 mines in Castile and León, Asturias, and Aragon. Approved aid of 2.13 billion EUR was directed at closing these mines by the end of 2018. A failure to close meant companies would have to return the subsidies.
In October 2018, a new framework agreement for the just transition of coal mining (2019–2027) was signed. The results of Spanish restructuring are stark: · Closure of 130 mines in less than three decades (from 146 in the early 90s to 12 by late 2017). · Elimination of over 25,000 jobs (from 30,000 active miners in 1994 to approx. 2,000 in 2018). · Production drop from 30 million tons in 1993 to less than 3 million in 2017.
The transition faces obstacles like industrial monoculture, depopulation, and an aging society. A negative psychological effect has been “boredom” among early retirees and social tensions between generations due to the presence of relatively well–paid retirees. By early 2020, only one small mine (Escondida) remained. All other coal mines were closed by December 2018, followed by the closure of thermal power plants in July 2020. This resulted in the loss of 6,700 direct jobs, a catastrophe for towns like Fabero where coal was the sole way of life for 175 years. To remedy this, Spain is implementing a “Just Transition Strategy” (2019–2027) to prevent the extinction of these areas, focusing on upskilling and employing workers in environmental reclamation or plant decommissioning. Notably, the Asturias program was implemented nearly 10 years later than in other Western European regions, allowing organizers to learn from previous European experiences.
Zygmunt Borkowski
Coal mining developed in the South Limburg area until the mid–1970s. The basin was located in the south of the country, close to the borders with Germany and Belgium. From around 1915, lignite was extracted using open–cast methods around the towns of Eygelshoven and Hoensbroek. These deposits were situated on the northwestern edge of a large German lignite basin west of Cologne. Lignite mining ended its operations in the Netherlands in 1968, when the last active mine, Carisbor, was closed.
Hard coal extraction was carried out in a belt stretching from northeastern Belgium through the Netherlands to Aachen. These were rural areas; therefore, the development of coal mining led to a rapid industrial expansion of the South Limburg region, where the population increased tenfold alongside this growth. Faced with rising production costs, a decline in domestic demand for coal, and the discovery of gas in the Dutch part of the North Sea, the government decided in 1965 to completely liquidate the coal mining sector.
Liquidation of the coal industry and employment restructuring
The Netherlands was the first Western European country to completely dismantle its coal industry. The mine liquidation program was primarily implemented between 1965 and 1974, while the main packages regarding the revitalization of the South Limburg region were carried out from 1975 to 1990. The coal industry was concentrated solely in South Limburg and was state–owned, operating mainly under the Dutch State Mines (DSM) along with a few small private mines. In 1966, 10 million tons of coal were produced annually. Between 1965 and 1975, out of 49,000 mining employees, approximately 24,400 (49%) left the industry: 8,700 retired, and 8,100 took early retirement at the age of 55 (underground miners). About 4,400 left the region, the majority being immigrants from Poland and Italy.
To minimize the social and economic consequences of the mine closure program in South Limburg, eight local governments (four of which were mining areas) established a cooperative association in 1965 called the Eastern Mining Area (Oosstelijke Mijnstreek). Its task was to prepare a baseline structural plan for the future development of local communities. At the start of the liquidation process, the lives of approximately 75,000 people were tied to the coal industry in South Limburg, representing 30% of the entire working population. Initially, unemployment was around 6%, but it decreased as many former miners found work in the construction industry, with many Dutch citizens moving to Germany for construction jobs.
Economic revitalization and revitalization costs
Despite early government assurances that mine closures would not increase unemployment in South Limburg, it reached as high as 20% in the mid–1980s. Today, it is low, standing at about 1% above the Dutch average and significantly lower than in former coal districts in Belgium or Germany. Between 1965 and 1977, 11,300 new jobs were created in South Limburg: 3,900 in the public sector, 4,500 in the private sector, and 2,900 through social work programs. Between 1978 and 1990, an additional 5,800 jobs were created as economic revitalization continued. DSM remained the largest employer, hiring approximately 6,000 former miners and transforming into a multinational chemical company. Currently, it employs 12,000 people, with 7,000 at the South Limburg plant.
The Dutch government’s approach included subsidizing ongoing coal production until closures, financing the liquidation process, and contributing to the miners’ pension fund for early retirement programs. Total expenditures for these purposes reached 1,770 million FL (3 billion USD at 2000 rates), with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) covering 360 million FL (180 million USD). Starting in 1975, a ten–year program titled “From Black to Green” (1975–1985) focused on land reclamation. It required investments of approximately 1,300 million FL (1.7 billion USD at 2000 rates) to revitalize old mine sites and build new infrastructure, including industrial, office, and residential buildings. The central budget provided 123.5 million FL, with the remainder sourced from the sale of reclaimed land. Government spending on revitalization and development reached 8,700 million FL (4.35 billion USD) between 1965 and 1977, and a further 6,500 million FL (3.25 billion USD) between 1978 and 1990.
Conclusions from the Dutch experience
While the Dutch mine closure program affected fewer miners than restructuring in France, West Germany, or the UK, the impact on South Limburg’s working population was immense. The revitalization program not only erased the physical scars of mining but established a foundation for new employment. The success depended on cooperation between various levels of government, trade unions, and the private sector. Although largely considered a success, certain indicators point to deeper social impacts: for instance, South Limburg has an abnormally high number of disability benefit recipients (25% higher than the national average), which may mask true unemployment levels.
Findings and conclusions from the 35–year restructuring period (1965–2000) include: · The liquidation caused a loss of 49,000 direct mining jobs and a total of 75,000 jobs including cooperating companies (30% of the regional workforce). · Nearly half of those affected left the labor market through retirement, while the other half had to find alternative employment. · A coordinated approach by local municipal authorities was critical for successful project implementation with the central government. · A transparent strategy focused on environmental protection, regional infrastructure, and quality of life was established with a clear deadline. · Former mine sites were used to improve overall urban and regional planning structures. Investments were intentionally directed toward education, research, and high–tech sectors to shift the region away from heavy industry. · Despite long–term strategies for SMEs, South Limburg remains overly dependent on large employers, which increases labor market risk. · Even with a structural plan, economic revitalization took a quarter of a century. Employment losses from coal were not fully compensated even by 2001, with high numbers remaining on disability or in protected social programs.
The Netherlands is now a major transshipment point for coal imported to Europe. The ports of Rotterdam and Amsterdam, alongside Antwerp in Belgium, form the most important hub for imported steam and coking coal. Today, coal in the Netherlands is imported and used mainly for energy production (51%). While coal consumption saw a sharp increase between 2011 and 2015, reaching 18 million tons, it has since accelerated its decline due to the closure of coal–fired power plants. Currently, the Netherlands consumes up to 6 million tons of coal for energy purposes.
Zygmunt Borkowski
Local governments no longer want anything to do with mining. They prefer EU funds.
The Just Transition Fund ultimately divided local governments and the mining industry. Relations between the two sides have historically varied, with frequent conflicts, but at key moments, local government officials from mining municipalities have been able to side with the mining industry, recognizing the industry’s importance to municipal budgets and the local labor market. Today, local governments openly attempt to block new private investments in mining, even seeking them at the government level.
“Enemy? An enemy! But mine, yours, ours – bred in your own blood!” – this quote from the cult comedy “Sami swoi” (Our Own) may have often come to mind for anyone who has observed the relationship between Silesian local governments and the mining industry in recent years. These relationships have remained tense. Tensions have arisen over issues such as the tax on underground mining, the review of traffic plans, the development of local plans, and the pace and scope of mining damage repair. All this friction, however, took place with the assumption that ultimately some compromise would have to be found, because – like it or not – both sides were doomed to operate side by side. Therefore, when plans for sudden mine closures arose (as in January 2015 and July 2020), Silesian local government officials strongly protested against these ideas, fearing their disastrous consequences for the local labor market and municipal budgets.
Today, this assumption of the necessity of some kind of cooperation is no longer valid. Silesian municipalities definitively no longer see their future in mining, nor do they intend to limit themselves to mere observers in the process of this sector’s “shrinkage.” In fact, they have begun actively opposing any attempts at new mining operations, fearing that this would cut them off from EU funding from the Just Transition Fund. This is precisely why local governments are trying to have coal mining licenses blocked for private investors, or even to have already issued licenses revoked by the Ministry of Climate and Environment.
Municipalities are afraid of collective responsibility. No one warned them about it.
Just a year ago, the discussion on the Just Transition Fund was dominated by three themes: the amount of money that was to be allocated to Polish mining regions through this mechanism; the number of voivodeships eligible for such support (the Silesian, Greater Poland, and Lower Silesian voivodeships were eligible for EU aid; Poland was seeking to add the Lublin, Łódź, and Lesser Poland voivodeships to this list); and the purpose of this money. The boundary conditions for using this aid were not discussed. It was clear that if these funds were intended to mitigate the effects of the transformation process, this transformation—understood as a shift away from a coal-based economy—must be implemented. However, there was no indication that using the JTF would de facto result in an immediate halt to investments in the mining sector. Or at least, such signals did not reach public opinion.
The “bombshell” did not explode until spring of this year. First, the “green” party began spreading reports of a possible denial of funding from the Fund for the Municipalities of the Turoszów Basin in Lower Silesia. However, it’s clear how the “green” parties feel about the coal industry, so many people likely considered these reports to be part of a media stunt. The opposite became clear when similar reports began to emerge from the provincial government. At the end of March, Wojciech Kałuża, Deputy Marshal of the Silesian Voivodeship, when asked about this issue during a meeting of the Parliamentary Standing Subcommittee on Just Transition, admitted that, according to the information he had received, “the possibility” of depriving municipalities where mining operations are developing access to the Fund for the Municipalities of Just Transition is being “very seriously considered.” Jakub Chełstowski, Marshal of the Silesian Voivodeship, later confirmed this in media interviews.
These words must have caused an uproar in the Silesian municipalities. Despite the planned phase-out of thermal coal mining in state-owned companies by 2049, the activities of private entities interested in mining this raw material remained an open question. Over the past decade, numerous attempts have been made to open new, private mines in Upper Silesia and the Zagłębie region, all of which have so far failed (we wrote more extensively on this topic at the end of last year). This sparked even greater interest following the news that the Ministry of Climate and Environment granted a license last fall to begin mining from the Brzezinka 3 deposit in Mysłowice. The license was awarded to the private company Brzezinka, thus culminating nearly a decade of efforts to obtain permission to build the mine. The mine was expected to operate until the 2040s (initially 2049, later 2040), extracting between 1.5 and approximately 3 million tons of coal annually. Local authorities approved the investment, hoping it would generate new jobs and revenue for the city budget. The news that it would also cut off the city from Just Transition Fund support came as a shock.
Meanwhile, further information from the Marshal’s Office caused even greater concern. It indicated that the consequences of a possible suspension of support from the Just Transition Fund would affect not only Mysłowice but also Katowice, Siemianowice Śląskie, Chorzów, Świętochłowice, and Ruda Śląska. All six cities form the Katowice subregion within the network of so-called NUTS (National Statistical Units) (all of Poland is divided into three NUT categories: regions, voivodeships, and subregions). It is at the NUTS-3 level (i.e., subregions) that funds from the Just Transition Fund are to be distributed. Figuratively speaking, all the cities mentioned above are “in the same boat” in this regard. Therefore, after meeting with the Marshal’s officials, local government officials submitted a petition to the European Commission asking that the remaining five cities not be linked to what is happening in Mysłowice and not be burdened with the “bill” for the planned construction of the mine there.
The ministry admitted that it was aware of Brussels’ warnings.
The Ministry of Climate and Environment initially attempted to contain the panic among local government officials, but it was not particularly successful. Piotr Dziadzio, Undersecretary of State in that ministry and Chief National Geologist, spoke in the Sejm in April, arguing that neither the regulation establishing the JTF nor its annex contained any provisions prohibiting the Fund from operating in regions developing mining activities, a fact he emphasized that he had personally verified. However, the rest of his statement was far from reassuring.
“Municipalities that have decided to agree on new coal mining concessions may have some difficulty accessing these funds, but this should not have any impact on neighboring municipalities, as the European Commission does not apply collective responsibility,” assessed Piotr Dziadzio. Over time, his confidence also waned. During the July meeting of the Just Transition Subcommittee, the Chief National Geologist reiterated that the regulation on the JTF did not specify the possibility or principles for excluding specific regions, cities, or municipalities based on new concessions in this region. He also stated that his ministry still did not have a clear position on the matter. The Ministry of Funds and Regional Policy shed more light on the situation, although it is doubtful whether the numerous local government officials from Silesia who attended the meeting were pleased with what they heard.
“Despite the lack of relevant provisions in the regulation establishing the JTF that would exclude support for regions where new mines are being opened or new coal mining concessions are being granted, EC representatives repeatedly indicated during meetings with the Polish side that the JTF would only support areas where the transition process is unidirectional.” This should be understood as actions to limit coal mining and combustion, while simultaneously refraining from granting new mining licenses, opening new mines, or increasing production in other mines (if they exist), the Ministry of Funds and Regional Policy stated in its position.
“Failure to comply with the EC’s recommendations by building new mines or granting coal mining licenses in areas located in regions aspiring to receive FST support may consequently hinder access to the funds in question,” the ministry warned. (During the same meeting, Artur Soboń, Deputy Minister of State Assets, admitted that due to LW Bogdanka’s strategy, the Lublin Voivodeship will likely not receive FST aid, which also confirms that the Fund’s commitment to actively “rolling back” mining is a fact).
Investors facing obstacles? Ministry announces changes to regulations
The chances that the petition addressed to the European Commission requesting leniency for municipalities in the Katowice subregion will bear fruit are rather slim – if local government officials themselves are to be believed. Consequently, they are proliferating with ideas on how to prevent investors from commencing mining operations. The Mayor of Mysłowice, Dariusz Wójtowicz, announced that on July 9th, he submitted a request to the Ministry of Climate and Environment to initiate the process of withdrawing the concession (the same one he had successfully approved) for the Brzezinka 3 deposit. Furthermore, as the Ministry stated, the letter failed to provide any legal basis or specific request under the Code of Administrative Procedure. In late April, the Mysłowice city council issued a similar appeal, arguing that the concession decision was based on “premises of false compliance with applicable local development plans,” which allegedly involved ignoring the plan’s prohibition on “conducting investment activities in a way that alters water conditions.” President Wójtowicz also pointed out the possibility of administrative action (or, more precisely, the lack thereof), which would effectively block the project.
“It will not be possible to commence extraction unless the company obtains water permits and approval of hydrological documentation,” Wójtowicz advised a parliamentary subcommittee (the former is issued by the Ministry of Culture and Environment, the latter by the voivodeship marshal).
“The public incitement by some local government officials to violate the law, including the Code of Administrative Procedure, in the context of our project is bizarre and unacceptable. This undermines the fundamental principles of the rule of law,” Piotr Talarek, an advisor to the management board of Brzezinka, commented on such ideas for PortalSamorzadowy.pl. According to the company representative, the initiatives aimed at revoking the company’s extraction license are based on erroneous, unsubstantiated premises and violate “the constitutional principles of trust in the actions of state bodies and equal treatment of economic entities.”
Local government officials from the Rybnik area are closely monitoring the situation in Mysłowice. Bapro, a company from Dąbrowa Górnicza, wants to establish a mine in the city, a move strongly opposed by local authorities. They attempted to block the investment by amending the local zoning plan (the case will ultimately reach the Supreme Administrative Court) and appealing the environmental decision. Finally, in early June, Rybnik Mayor Piotr Kuczera appealed to Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, directly requesting that the Ministry of Climate and Environment refrain from issuing a license to Bapro.
“The transformation process will be a difficult challenge for our region (…) and will require additional actions and appropriate support. A lack of funding from the Fund for the Protection of Natural Resources would be an additional penalty for the residents of our region, who suffer the negative effects of mining operations daily,” wrote Mayor Kuczera.
It is currently unclear how the stalemate in Mysłowice will end. It was telling that during the July meeting of the Just Transition Subcommittee, which was discussed earlier, Piotr Dziadzio made no comment on the ideas put forward by the Mayor of Mysłowice. He did, however, announce changes to the Geological and Mining Law. The essence of these changes is to introduce additional boundary conditions, defining which types of mining activities can be conducted in connection with various phenomena occurring both in the EU and in Poland.
“The issuance of such a license will be consulted with the Ministry of Finance and Development. We are introducing an additional point in our procedure that additionally examines any potential threats or risks in the future related to just transition funds or other activities in mining areas,” said Piotr Dziadzio. This may indicate that the ministry will want to avoid similar tensions in the future by blocking the issuance of coal mining licenses.
Profit and loss account. What are the future scenarios?
The nervous reactions of local government officials and the pressure they exert on the Ministry of Culture and Environment are the result of the €2 billion that, thanks to the Fund for the Protection of the Environment (FST), is to be distributed to selected municipalities in the Silesian Voivodeship between 2021 and 2027. Indeed, this is almost three-quarters of what the voivodeship is to receive under the regional program for 2021-2027 (which, incidentally, is the largest of all 16 such programs in Poland). It’s important to note that the €2 billion figure represents an optimistic scenario (subject to Poland’s commitment to achieving zero emissions by 2050, which is still unclear), while the pessimistic scenario would halve the amount of support from the FST. It’s also worth considering the fact that it’s unclear how this money will be distributed within the voivodeship, how much of it will be allocated to individual cities, and how this amount will compare to the revenues contributed to local government budgets by the mining sector. In the case of Mysłowice, media reports mention PLN 144 million, which is supposedly allocated to the FTS (Fundamental Tax Fund), although this amount is primarily handled by the Mysłowice authorities (other cities in the region have not confirmed that they are aware of any amounts “allocated” to municipalities). This represents less than a third of the city’s revenue this year. Representatives of the Brzezinka company calculate that they can exceed this amount, as they are supposed to pay PLN 25 million annually into the city budget in fees and local taxes, which would amount to over PLN 200 million over the mine’s entire lifespan. This figure also includes the municipality’s share of corporate income tax (CIT) and personal income tax (PIT) from the residents employed at the mine. In other words, according to the investor’s estimates, the city would benefit more from the new “large” company than from the FTS, although company representatives consistently maintain that the two are not mutually exclusive. “The long-underway “Brzezinka 3″ project will not result in the exclusion or loss of even a portion of the funds or support from the Fund for the Protection of Solidarity Funds (FST) or other EU funds. In our opinion, quite the opposite. Innovative solutions related to the Brzezinka 3 project will qualify for additional absorption of EU funds related to innovative technologies and energy transformation processes,” wrote Piotr Talarek in response to questions from PortaluSamorządowy.pl.
The situation looks completely different from the perspective of, for example, Ruda Śląska, which stands to gain nothing from the new mine in Mysłowice, and the potential loss of FST support will hurt it even more severely because the “Ruda” mine currently operating in the city (i.e., the former KWK “Pokój,” “Halemba,” and “Bielszowice”) is scheduled to cease mining in 2034. What then? No one knows at this point. It seems that the future of one of Silesia’s most mining-intensive cities depends, on the one hand, on the arrival of new investors capable of filling the space vacated by the mining sector and its collaborating companies; on the other, on maintaining the Fund for the Future (FST) funding, which is intended to prepare the city for the post-coal era; and, on the third, on maintaining the over-decade-long schedule for phasing out the local mines of the Polish Mining Group (PGG). Any acceleration of this schedule would mean a “no-depreciation” transformation.
And no one is eager to see this, as the city’s residents could see the consequences of such a move just across the street – in Bytom, where seven mines and two steelworks were closed after 1989. The effects are still visible in demographic statistics. Between 2000 and 2020, Bytom lost 16.5% of its population, making it one of the two fastest-depopulating cities in Poland. Number one on this list was Wałbrzych, where the local mines closed even more rapidly, while third place went to Łódź, where the textile industry had long been the backbone of the local economy. The same scenario unfolded in all three cities – first, a local economic crash, then the resulting outflow of young people, which resulted in a shift in the age structure of the local population. This, in turn, translated into a lower birth rate, and thus the process of depopulation continued. Importantly, as demographers emphasize, there is a certain “threshold” of population outflow, beyond which the changes in the age structure become so significant that the negative birth rate cannot be compensated for even by a potential return to a positive migration balance. In other words, even if such a crash were followed by new investment, attracting new workers, it may be too late to rescue the city from its demographic collapse.
Three licenses in three years. More are waiting in line.
Since 2018, in addition to the Brzezinka company license, the Ministry of Climate and Environment has issued two more hard coal mining licenses. One was awarded to Jastrzębska Spółka Węglowa (Bzie Dębina I Zachód) for the construction of a new mine in Jastrzębie Bzie. The project is scheduled to run until 2051 and will involve the extraction of coking coal. The second license, however, concerns the planned Heedi II thermal coal mine in Lower Silesia. The license is valid until 2025, although – as Piotr Dziadzio, Chief National Geologist, informed us – actual mining was supposed to begin by May 15th of this year. Since this did not happen, the ministry has requested the company to rectify the license violations (it had until the beginning of July 30th to submit an explanation). Additionally, five other mining license applications are underway, four of which do not involve building a new mine, but rather exploiting deposits from existing infrastructure. The fifth, and the only case where a new mine is actually planned, concerns Nowa Ruda, where Coal Holding would like to mine coking coal. The application was submitted in 2018, but correspondence has been ongoing between the company and the ministry for some time now regarding – as the ministry puts it – “the entrepreneur demonstrating investment resources that will ensure the rational use and construction of the mine.”
Michał Wroński, journalist at PortalSamorzadowy.pl
